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iv1. Introduction
Comparative institutional analysis has increasingly gained interest from economists in the
recent decade. Globalization, European integration and the dual transition of a host of
countries from authoritarian and socialist systems to democracy and capitalism have drawn
attention to the divergent ways to organize market economic systems. Most importantly, the
new institutional economics pinpointed the importance of written and unwritten institutional
rules for the formation of incentives in an economy (Coase 1937; Coase 2005, North 1990).
This dissertation examines the type of institutional systems that emerge in Central and
Eastern European transition countries. The introduction serves to set the three separate
articles of the thesis into their broader context
1. To do so, it will provide a brief overview of
the development of the new institutional economics out of questioning a number of
assumptions in the neoclassical economic framework of a general equilibrium. A distinction
of the New Institutional Economics according to several levels of analyis provides a useful
backdrop to discuss a number of approaches to compare institutions and their determinants.
The inﬂuential approach to compare market economies of the varieties-of-capitalism
framework is then introduced as a synthesis of New Institutional Economics approaches and
political science interest in comparative capitalist systems. The contribution of the three
articles will be brieﬂy sketched.
1.1 From Neoclassical economics to the New Institutional Economics
The central tenet of neoclassical equilibrium theory is expressed in the First Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics about the existence of an equilibrium, which was proven by
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954). It states that under the assumption of complete
markets all competitive exchange equilibria are Pareto-optimal. The market completeness
assumption entails several crucial assumptions regarding actual exchange: ﬁrst, the law of the
single price means that both producers and consumers face the same prices. Moreover, they
are price takers. This is meant when the Walrasian process is characterized as competitive.
Second, no disequilibrium trading is allowed meaning that no trading at any but the
equilibrium prices can happen. A different deﬁnition of competitive markets assumes large
numbers of anonymous market participants with negligible entry and exit costs, in which case
1. Since the three articles are self-contained, some repetition of concepts in the introduction and the articles is
unavoidable.
1the assumptions above do not need to hold. This entails also the assumption of complete
market transparency meaning that all market participants know the relevant prices. It is
irrefutable that Walrasian equilibrium theory is a powerful tool to point out economically
efﬁcient allocations and the strong role of relative prices for reaching them. In this respect it
was adequate for neoclassical economic theory, for one of its main focuses was the proof of
Adam Smith’s famous notion of the invisible hand. The allocational power of decentralized
exchange, in which no actor needs to know more than market prices, was rigorously proven.
Also the way the ﬁrm is characterized gave some important insights. It stressed the role of
returns to scale. Very generally, it allows to analyze how optimal production choices vary
with prices. Furthermore, continuative models relaxing the assumption of perfect competition
help to understand aggregate industry behaviour (Hart 1995: 16-17). However, Walrasian
competitive equilibrium and the ﬁrm as a production function as sketched here have been
criticized both for conceptual weaknesses and more generally for the strong assumptions
accompanying the crucial market completeness assertion. The long list of implicit and
explicit assumptions for the general equilibrium is aptly summarized by Blaug 1997: “…
perfectly rational, omniscient, identical consumers; zero transaction costs; complete markets
for all time-stated claims for all conceivable contingent events, no trading at disequilibrium
prices, no radical, incalculable uncertainty; (…) only linearly homogeneous production
functions; no technical progress requiring capital investment ….” The fact that further
questions were raised by the Walrasian notion of competitive equilibria and its assumptions
was the main reason for the further development of economic theory beyond the competitive
equilibrium perception and particularly the incorporation of transaction costs and institutional
analysis. The fact that goods and factors in the Arrow-Debreu world are homogenous
precludes any kind of longer-term relationships between market participants, since singular
contracts are reached on spot markets. Issues such as reputation and trust, which seem
important for business relations cannot be modelled. Absence of spatial preferences rules out
transaction costs including such costs as search costs and informational costs. Complete
market transparency also implies that all relevant information is costless and all participants
must be capable of processing information instantly and correctly. While the neoclassical
theorists acknowledged the existence of transaction costs and institutions, they treated the
former mostly as negligible and the latter as “allocationally neutral” (Furubotn and Richter
2005: 12). In fact, Furubotn and Richter (2005: 12-13) summarize a number of incidences,
which allow to point out an implicitly accepted neutralism regarding actual institutional set-
ups in the allocational mechanism in the neoclassical world.
With respect to production, institutional neutrality manifests itself most importantly in the
distinction of markets and hierarchies. Ronald H. Coase asks in his seminal article “The
INTRODUCTION 2Nature of the Firm” (1937) why ﬁrms exist in the ﬁrst place given the efﬁciency of the
market. Obviously, within the ﬁrm the price mechanism is abrogated: “[i]f a workman moves
from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices,
but because he is ordered to do so” (387). Hence, in Coase’s words the “distinguishing mark
of the ﬁrm is the supersession of the price mechanism” (389). Neoclassical models, which
resort to the black-box production function view of ﬁrms cannot explain this, because taking
away a transaction out of the market represents an inefﬁciency. Contrastingly, they are able
to explain why it should not matter whether factors are owned or rented: “in a perfect
competitive market it really doesn’t matter who hires whom: so have labor hire capital”
(Samuelson 1957: 894). This, however, presupposes complete uniformity of power
distribution among members of a society/economy (Stigler 1968: 181). Moreover, regardless
of the market type, be it monopoly or atomistic ﬁrms, bargaining would nevertheless lead to a
Pareto-optimal outcome (Demsetz 1968) provided complete foresight and information are
assumed (Arrow 1979). Apart from that, Furubotn and Richter (2005) add observations
relating to the sphere of exchange in the neoclassical model. In fact, it does not make a
difference whether trade takes place with the use of money or barter (Samuelson 1968).
Furthermore, neither frequency of exchange nor any form of social relationship among actors
affects the outcome. By some, the contribution by Coase 1960, which made history within
economic theory under the heading of the ‘Coase theorem’, was taken as an expansion of the
set of cases expressed in the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, where
decentralized allocation mechanisms lead to efﬁcient outcomes (Buchanan and
Tullock 1962). However, if read carefully, Coase also makes the assumption that efﬁcient
outcomes of bargaining over the internalization of externalities occur if there are no
impediments to bargaining, thus the ability to write complete contracts. But in those very
cases the Fundamental Theorem also works, hence the Coase theorem is not even needed
(Farrell 1987). What Coase yet calls for is twofold: ﬁrst, he points out that the market is not
the only way to implement a Pareto-superior allocation. One policy implication is that in
some cases more precisely formulated and tradable property rights are needed. Second, Coase
makes clear under which conditions the private rearrangement of property rights might solve
coordination problems, when neither markets or states through Pigouvian taxation can
succeed (Bowles 2004: 227-230).
A further well documented peculiarity of the Walrasian model relates to the comparison of
opposed economic systems, capitalism and socialism. Starting in the depression period in
inter-war America a group of mathematical economists applied the mathematics of the
general equilibrium to planned economies. Leading ﬁgures were Oskar Lange (1936) and
Abba Lerner (1934). The intellectual seed for this had been planted by Vilfredo Pareto, who
INTRODUCTION 3had noted, or rather tentatively speculated that a government wanting to maximize well-being
could also set the coefﬁcients of productions so as to match the conditions of a perfect
competition when price equals marginal costs. Speciﬁcally, Lange envisioned a system, in
which the means of production belong to the society, or the state for that matter. His system
has been described as a liberal form of market socialism (Young 2005). Since this involves
the removal of competitive markets, artiﬁcial markets are created, for which so-called
managers of production (Lange 1936: 61) set prices arbitrarily and proceed in a trial-and-
error fashion to arrive at equilibrium prices. The similarity to Walrasian auctioneering is
central to the argument: “… prices in a socialist economy can be determined by the same
process of trial and error by which prices on a competitive market are determined” (66).
Moreover, Lange considered his system superior to a competitive capitalist economy, since it
does not need to accommodate interest groups. All revenues are diverted to the state, which
can arrange for a more egalitarian distribution of income (‘the socialist dividend’). He and his
collaborators again used Pareto’s cautious remarks that one should carefully discern
limitations of the invisible-hand-model in order to establish situations in which it can work
and where it does not hold (Young 2005). However, in using this as the starting point for an
intellectual and conceptual assault on competitive market coordination they put the argument
upside down. This is so, because just like Arrow and Debreau, Lange also needs the
assumption of costless markets to make the mathematics of his model work. Hence, what
Pareto had called for, namely research into the conditions for the invisible hand to work is
conducted by neither of them. It was Hayek 1945, who dismissed the theoretical possibility
of planning according to equilibrium prices, because the complexity of information would not
be manageable for planners. Hence, he conducts early conceptual steps in the direction of
taking information costs and limited cognitive ability of actors seriously. However, what
leaves the observer most astonished is the fact that making use of “the zero-transaction-cost
world of neoclassical economics, the two economic systems that have been viewed as the
arch rivals of [last] century, capitalism and socialism, can be modelled by general
equilibrium systems.” (Furubotn and Richter 2005: 18).
The origins of the New Institutional Economics
2 are not rooted in a conceptual critique of the
workings of the Walrasian equilibrium, but are primarily based on an uneasiness with the
2. It should be noted that a broad range of approaches usually unite under the heading of the New Institutional
Economics. Furubotn and Richter (2005) in their overview of the literature count at least ten subﬁelds: while
they regard transaction cost economics, property-rights analysis and the economic theory of contracts as the core
of New Institutional Economics, the following subﬁelds are also related to it: New Institutional Economic
History, Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis, Evolutionary game theory, Constitutional
Economics, theories of Collective Action, the neo-institutional approach to political science and institutionalism
within organization theory and sociology. While these approaches differ with respect to objects of study and
sometimes are interwoven to a non-trivial extent, they have in common that all subscribe to the view that
transaction costs should be acknowledged and that individuals are not completely rational.
INTRODUCTION 4assumptions of it: “the world of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as the
physical world would be without friction” (Stigler 1972: 12). Hence, Williamson’s (1985: 19)
criticism of economists, who at his time of writing had not yet followed the physicists’
example to leave the world of frictionless models and explicitly take transaction costs (“the
world around them”) into account. The shift from complete rationality to bounded rationality
is connected to the work of Frank Knight (1922) and Herbert Simon (1955). The introduction
of positive transaction costs was called for by Ronald H. Coase (1937) and most notably
further developed by Oliver E. Williamson (1975, 1985).
The acknowledgement of the need to explicitly include transactions and their costs into the
analysis of economic exchange is the main tenet of the New Institutional Economics. In its
earliest deﬁnition, transaction costs are the “cost of using the price mechanism” (Coase 1937:
390) or even more broadly the “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow 1969 cited
Williamson 1985: 18). Furubotn and Richter (2005: 51-57) distinguish between market
transaction costs, managerial transaction costs and political transaction costs. In addition to
the introduction of transaction costs into economic models adherents to the New Institutional
Economics also question the assumption of complete rationality within neoclassical thinking.
The neoclassical model assumed perfect rationality, which essentially means that a
“completely rational individual has the ability to foresee everything that might happen and to
evaluate and optimally choose among available courses of action, all in the blink of an eye
and at no costs.” (Kreps 1990: 745). The most proliﬁc critic of this view is Herbert Simon.
He sets out on the “task (…) to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of
rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational
capacities that are actually possessed by (…) man…” (Simon 1955: 99). This capacity, he
argues, “is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for
(…) rational behavior (…) or even for a reasonable approximation…” (Simon 1957: 198).
This means that both the complexity of problems and the limited cognitive aptitude of human
beings leads to a situation, in which perfect rationality cannot be upheld (also North 1990:
25). In effect, individuals can be regarded to be “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”
(Simon 1947). Simon is inﬂuenced by Knight’s (1922) distinction between uncertainty and
risk. In a situation of risk individuals are able to assign probability values to possible future
states of the world. In this case actors can calculate expected utilities and feed them into
traditional utility-maximizing models. However, in the case of uncertainty this is no longer
possible, because no predictions on the basis of probabilities are possible. Simon argues that
the world should be characterized as inhibiting uncertainty. Then man is not able to perceive
all imaginable choice alternatives, nor assess and consistently valuate consequences (pay-
offs) of all feasible alternatives. It should be further stressed that both concepts of transaction
INTRODUCTION 5costs and bounded rationality are closely interrelated. Stated differently, if we were to assume
complete rationality, then the concept of positive transaction costs would not make sense,
because a completely rational actor, who ‘knows everything’, does not need to invest in any
of the ex ante costs of contract initiation and ex post costs of supervision and enforcement.
On the other hand, given the cognitive limits stressed by Simon, any contract but the very
simplest one becomes “unavoidably incomplete” (Williamson 2000: 601).
1.2 New Institutional Economics – three levels of analysis
A useful distinction of strands of the new institutional economics for this dissertation is given
by Williamson (2000). The distinction is made according to three levels of institutional
analysis. The two overarching level are related to the institutional environment given by
cultural roots and legal rules. Those are the levels, which provide the institutional
environment or simply the informal and formal “rules of the game”. The main question when
analyzing the two levels relates to the impact of formal and informal institutions on
incentives of individuals and ﬁrms. On a third level of analysis, the property-rights school
and transaction cost economics as a special case look at governance structures on the ﬁrm
level or institutional arrangements. The main questions are who should own an asset, or
stated differently, when should a ﬁrm produce a good or service in-house or when should it
be outsourced.
The literature on governance structures can be best distinguished according to those
approaches, which model them as ex-ante incentive alignment devices and those, which see
them as ex-post governance (Gibbons 2005). Williamson’s transaction cost economics (1985)
as part of the latter centers around the analysis of the type of transaction a ﬁrm deals in. Asset
speciﬁcity, frequency and uncertainty of transactions are three dimensions of the transaction,
which determine outcomes with regard to contractual relations. Among these, asset
speciﬁcity or the degree of idiosyncrasy of investments is the key dimension. Asset
speciﬁcity refers to the degree to which an investment can be redeployed to alternative uses
without decreasing its value of the ﬁrst-best employment. Hence, typically a situation
emerges, in which an investment generates higher returns in a particular application than
elsewhere. Stated differently, if a speciﬁc asset were nevertheless redeployed to a second-best
application, a loss in income would occur. The difference between the incomes of ﬁrst-best
and second-best usages is referred to as the quasi-rent (Klein et al. 1978). It can be regarded
as a measure of asset speciﬁcity: a larger quasi-rent is associated with a higher asset
speciﬁcity, and vice versa (Williamson 1985: 52-56). Coupled with the frequency with which
the transaction takes place, a transaction with a high speciﬁcity of assets tends to be produced
within the ﬁrm, while transactions with lower asset speciﬁcity are most efﬁciently procured
INTRODUCTION 6on the market. The overall empirical evidence of the transaction costs economics approach is
not clear. While Williamson repeatedly claims that the theory is an “empirical success story”
(Williamson 1999: 1092; 2000: 605) and earlier reviews such as Shelanski and Klein
(1995: 335) come to the conclusion that the empirical results are “remarkably consistent”
with TCE’s predictions, recent representative reviews come to more careful conclusions.
Reviewing a number of studies selected on the basis of citation impacts David and Han 2004
ﬁnd 47% of 63 empirical papers (including 163 empirical tests) with supporting evidence.
Best results are obtained when asset speciﬁcity is used as the independent variable. However,
the authors note that for instance the frequency of transaction does not enter the analysis in
any of the papers in their sample. Hence, there is no study, which would test all three main
characteristics, which are said to inﬂuence the choice of governance modes, asset speciﬁcity,
uncertainty and frequency (Carter and Hodgson 2006: 467). Bearing in mind the great
amount of empirical applications, which the approach has generated, the overall picture
painted by recent reviews is rather meagre. So far, most studies cannot be consistently
compared, because methodologies and data employed greatly differ. Hence, it can be
foreseen that the already bulging literature will (and should) grow even more. 
What are the connections between the institutional environment and particular institutional
arrangements? Williamson (1991: 287) proposes to view “the institutional environment as a
set of parameters, changes in which elicit shifts in the comparative costs of governance”. In
other words, the institutional environment determines (in parts) the comparative costs of
different governance mechanisms. Ceteris paribus, then, the “effect of changes in the
institutional environment within nation states and differences in the institutional environment
between nation states can both be investigated in this way” (Williamson 2000: 97).
1.3 Comparing institutions
Generally speaking, two strategies of comparing institutions of the institutional environment
across countries are found in the literature. There are a large number of studies, which look at
single institutions or spheres of insitutions and then conduct cross-sectional or longitudinal
comparisons. This is the approach of the “new comparative economics” (Djankov et al.
2003). A second strategy involves modeling institutions as part of institutional systems. Here,
the notion of institutional complementarities is central. While the ﬁrst approach is generally
interested in the institutional root causes of divergent development records, the second
approach models different variants of market economic interaction, which are able to
generate good macroeconomic outcomes in terms of income. 
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et al. (2003) set out from the basic concept that every institutional setting attempts to ﬁnd an
efﬁcient solution to a trade-off between dictatorship and disorder. Dictatorship is seen as
expropriation by the state through murder, taxation or selective granting of monopoly
positions to single ﬁrms, while disorder refers to expropriation by private individuals such as
theft, violation of agreements and also “private subversion of public institutions” through
bribery. The trade-off arises from the observation that a strong state, which in principle is
able to control private expropriation (disorder), at the same time has the capacity of
dictatorial abuse of its powers (Weingast 1993). Institutions here have the function to control
the dangers arising out of the trade-off between dictatorship and disorder. In this sense, the
control of dictatorship is referred to as rule of law, while law and order controls potential
disorder of private activities (Shleifer 2002). Conceptually, an institutional possibilities
frontier is introduced, which is constructed by feasible combinations of different degrees of
disorder and dictatorship. As a way of illustration, Djankov et al. (2003) discuss four
representative mechanisms for the protection against monopoly pricing or predatory
behaviour by companies. The mechanisms represent different degrees of disorder and
dictatorship, hence different solutions to the trade-off. The lowest degree of dictatorship is
presented by private orderings. The market disciplines market participants by weeding out
adverse behaviour. The authors take the example of the efﬁciency and quality of information
disclosure in securities markets: in this setting the private ordering solution submits that
issuers of securities have incentives for good conduct, because in order to remain in business,
they need to build up reputation. State inﬂuence and hence dictatorship is at a minimal level
in this setting. However, as the authors note, the low degree of security against private
expropriation can have adverse effects such as monopoly building, underinvestment in
security of workplaces, and in the extreme can lapse into maﬁa-like conditions. The steep
shape of the institutional possibilities frontier means that the marginal rate of substitution
between disorder and dictatorship is large: a large degree of disorder can be removed by
increasing dictatorship by relatively little. Independent judges (employed by the state) are
installed in order to impartially solve legal disputes, when contract partners feel mistreated.
There can be differences between judicial systems as regards judicial discretion, which can
have slightly different results for the extent of disorder and dictatorship present in the society.
Government regulation of securities issues represents the third mechanism, which increases
state inﬂuence yet more. In the case of securities markets this means that a public agency is
set up, which lays down rules of disclosure and conduct and inspects the behaviour of market
participants. Regulatory entities can be more efﬁcient than judges, because they can act pre-
emptively and are arguably less susceptible to bribery than judges (Glaeser and
Shleifer 2003). The fourth type of controlling the securities market would be to nationalize
INTRODUCTION 8security issuance, in which case the state fully controls it. That would entail a large increase
in dictatorship with a modest decrease of disorder in any given economic activity. In some
areas, however, it can be efﬁcient, for instance with regards to safety issues. The basic
framework is used in number of studies. The initial paper contains some comparative studies,
where the framework is used. It encompasses both cross-country approaches at one point in
time (also Glaeser and Shleifer 2002) and longitudinal studies of one country over time (also
Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). Furthermore, references to legal institutions in development
issues and institutional possibilities in transition countries are made. Other papers, most
notably within the Legal Origins tradition (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008), do not
always explicitly refer to the framework of the new comparative economics, but nevertheless
generally adhere to the basic ideas, can be seen as empirical applications, and include the
same group of researchers. 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) start from the observation that the American Common Law
tradition dramatically changed its stance from a dominance of private litigations to increasing
government regulation at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. The system of private
litigation became unsustainable with the emergence of large corporations (‘robber barons’)
during American industrialization, which had the power to circumvent law and shape it
according to their needs. As a result, an “inequality of weapons” arose, which made it
virtually impossible for private individuals to get justice in disputes with large corporation
(Glaeser and Shleifer 2003: 407). However, from the 1880s onwards and with increasing
speed after the turn of the century the American legislative put into existence numerous
public regulations acts. They ranged from antitrust measures (Sherman Act in 1890), food
and drug safety legislation in 1906, banking in 1913 and eventually regulation of securities
market in the 1930s. This increase of regulation can be explained using the framework
introduced above. In terms of Figure 4 it means that before regulation the US economy
operated on an equilibrium somewhere on the upper half of the institutional possibilities
frontier with a predominance of private litigation. However, industrialization and rising
inequality between capital and labour among other things shifted the instiutional possibilities
frontier both outward (i.e. every quantity of dictatorship is associated with higher disorder)
and steepened the slope (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between disorder and
dictatorship increases and hence relatively more disorder can be decreased when dictatorship
is increased). In the new setting, it was efﬁcient for the society to move along the new
institutional possibilities frontier downward to a new equilibrium, in which disorder is greatly
reduced (for instance to the pre-industrialization value) by introducing more governmental
regulation (and thereby increasing dictatorship). A similar story in a cross-country setting is
developed in Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). This paper explains the emergence of the common
INTRODUCTION 9law tradition in England and the civil law system in France in the 12th and 13th century.
While England at that time was a relatively peaceful country with a strong king, who held
central power over the entire country, in war-torn France local nobilities had considerable
power and could use the local legal institutions to their favour. In terms of the framework,
France’s institutional possibilities frontier at that time was farther from the origin than
England’s because of the prevailing and constant threat of disorder. It was also steeper,
because at the margin the use of dictatorship to contain disorder was more effective, partly
because of the high quantity of absolute disorder and the decentralized political sphere.
Hence, out of efﬁciency considerations it was more efﬁcient for France to choose a civil law
system with relatively more dictatorship comprising state-employed judges and stringent
procedural and legal codes minimizing discretionary decision power by judges. England, in
contrast, could ‘afford’ to install a decentralized common law tradition with independent
judges and judge-made law, because due to the relatively peaceful environment and
centralized rule of the king the laws were not as vulnerable to private misuse as in France.
Djankov, Glaeser et al. (2004) go on to argue that not always are institutions chosen on
efﬁciency grounds but through simple transplantation of institutions from one country to
another. Closely related to this transplantation effect for developing countries, the second set
of empirical papers follows the basic idea of legal tradition and submits in a series of papers
that the law tradition within a given country matters for ﬁnancial development and hence for
economic development. La Porta et al. (1997) start from the observation that different legal
families provide different degrees of shareholder and creditor protection. English common
law is portrayed as the most investor-friendly, while German and French civil law exhibit the
least investor-friendly features. As a fourth legal family, Scandinavian law takes a middle
position. With regards to law enforcement a similar ranking results after controlling for
income differences of countries (La Porta et al. 1998). Even more so, countries with common
law tradition have better functioning governments than those with French civil law tradition
(La Porta et al. 1999). In the series of papers La Porta et al. establish the claim that on the
whole the common law countries with greater degrees of freedom result in better ﬁnancial
markets and eventually lead to better economic performance. La Porta et al.’s results are,
however, challenged by Berkowitz et al. (2003), who give a more nuanced account by
considering the way a speciﬁc law (or legal tradition) was transplanted in different countries
(see also Kogut and Ragin 2006). As a result, it is more important how receptive a country is
to the transplanted law, hence “the country’s ability to give meaning to the imported law”
(174). The receptivity refers to the process of transplantation: in the case of conscious
adaptation it is assumed that the receiving country has a grasp of the meaning of the
legislation. This is proxied by whether changes to the adopted laws have been made or not
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measure of familiarity with the laws. In the latter case it need not be the case that colonial
transplantation was always connected to imposing unfamiliar law to the conquered country:
in the case of large inﬂux of settlers bringing the legal system with them, familiarity was
essentially there (see also Acemoglu et al. 2001). Berkowitz et al. use the same sample of
countries as La Porta et al. and are able to show that the not the legal family as such is
important for economics performance, but the way it was adopted and the ability of the
receiving country to actually work with these laws. Hence, while La Porta et al. derive as a
policy implication for developing countries to introduce the more liberal common law rather
than civil law (speciﬁcally not the French type), Berkowitz et al. come to subtler policy
recommendation: before introducing a legal system make sure it not completely unfamiliar to
locals. This can be done by either taking into account a similar legal heritage or invest in
training in order to acquaint legal actors with the meaning of the new laws.
The theoretical observation that institutions are crucial for economic performance has
triggered a burgeoning empirical literature on the scope and magnitude of the effect and on
the direction of causality. Most of the research focuses on the relationship between
institutions and GDP growth or GDP levels
3. Arguably the earliest contribution is Barro
1991. His primary goal, however, is to explore the lack of statistical evidence for the
theoretical tenet within growth literature that low income countries grow faster than high
income countries (the main reason for this is diminishing returns to capital). One of the
control variables Barro includes is the political stability of countries measured as the number
of coups d’états and political assassinations into both investment and growth equations for
several long periods. He ﬁnds that they have signiﬁcantly negative impacts on both, however,
cannot clearly establish the direction of causality. Several papers follow in Barro’s fairway.
Knack and Keefer 1995 ﬁnd signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investment in the periods from 1974-89
and 1960-89. Apart from indirect effects they also ﬁnd some direct effect on growth. A
similar estimation is carried out by Brunetti et al. 1998 using above mentioned survey results
on political credibility of countries. They ﬁnd a positive impact of credibility on investment
and growth. More recently, the problem of the direction of causality between institutions and
economic performance came to the forefront. This led researchers to include instrumental
variables. Mauro 1995 uses ethnolinguistic fragmentation
4 as an instrument for corruption.
3. Methodological issues arise both with respect to the choice of institutional proxies with authors using both
subjective and objective measures of institutions and the choice of the independent variable as either GDP
growth or stocks. Thirdly, a direct effect from institutions must be kept separate from intermediate effects on
investment levels or ﬁnancial development. For more detailed discussion see Aron (2000).
4. Measured as the probability that two randomly drawn members of a society do not belong to the same
ethnolinguistic group (Mauro 1995: 692).
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fragmentation tends to render control of agents harder or make for larger cronyism by
bureaucrats favouring certain groups over others. Corruption, then, tends to increase. Hall
and Jones 1999 and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use instruments for GDP levels as
dependent variable. The former employ the distance from the equator and the share of the
population speaking a major European language as instruments for the institutional
environment (‘social infrastructure’ in their parlance). Both instruments are intended to
approximate the extent of European inﬂuence on a country. The ﬁrst refers to the intuition
that European tended to settle in sparsely populated and climatically moderate areas, whereas
the second captures cultural aspects. 
A subtler version of this is presented in Acemoglu et al. (2001). They start from the
observation that European colonizers essentially followed one of two colonization patterns:
on the one extreme extractive states where established, whose only purpose was to exploit
natural resources. The other extreme entailed settling in colonies with the purpose of long-
term engagements. In the former case, no institutions of property rights were established,
while in the latter case European-style institutions of private property and government checks
were imported and reproduced. The underlying reason why one strategy was chosen over the
other was the state of environment: in places, where the climate was inhospitable and disease-
ridden, Europeans would not settle, but rather exploit. Conversely, where the conditions were
favourable to Europeans and survival probability high, they stayed and settled (Acemoglu et
al. 2001: 1370). Hence, settler mortality is used as an instrument, because it is argued that it
inﬂuenced institutions as they exist now, but has no impact on today’s performance. When
instrumenting institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2001) ﬁnd large support for the relevance of
institutions for economic development and are able to establish a clear causality, which runs
from institutions to wealth. Hall and Jones (1999) and Mauro come to similar results.
Systemic approaches at comparing institutions center around the concept of institutional
complementarities (Aoki 1994, 2001). One approach, which takes up both presented concepts
in the tradition of the new institutional economics and concepts coming from political
scientiests’ attempts at comparing democratic capitalist systems, centers around the varieties-
of-capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). It stands in a long tradition of
political science approaches of comparative capitalism, whose origins reach back as far as
Andrew Shonﬁeld’s “Modern Capitalism” in Shonﬁeld 1965. Shonﬁeld analyses the capacity
of states in supporting the modernization of economies after the war. He describes German
capitalism as cooperative and organised with de facto planning features due to the universal
banking system. In France ofﬁcial planning authorities exerted considerable control of the
economy, often by a small elite circumventing ofﬁcial legislation. In contrast to that, in the
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guaranteeing institutional frameworks, but not engaging in planning. In the 1970s the
phenomenon of rising inﬂation and unemployment (“stagﬂation”) in the industrialized
economies triggered the literature on neo-corporatism which predominantly deals with
macro-issues. For example, states are grouped according to their scope of wage-bargaining
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). This approach also deals with sectoral differences in
coordination. On the micro-level neo-institutionalism looks at the institutional setting with
regard to the ﬁnance sector and the role of the state Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994. At
about the same time another strand of literature emerged which Hall 1999 classiﬁes as
Organization of Production. It distinguishes various modes of coordination of work
processes in ﬁrms and particularly considers changing modes of production and
accompanying institutional requirements (Chandler 1990, Lazonick 1991). 
The VoC approach draws on its predecessors, but drawing in part on the new institutional
economics was developed further in essentially three respects. Firstly, it is a micro-approach
placing ﬁrms as central actors of an economy in the centre of analysis. Thus, the central
question is: how do ﬁrms deal with coordination problems that arise in the interaction with
capital owners, workers and other ﬁrms. The authors argue that the existent institutions for
coordination distinguish different types of capitalism. In ‘liberal market economies’ (LME)
coordination is primarily characterized by price signals and formal contracting in competitive
markets. In contrast to that, in ‘coordinated market economies’ (CME) there are several non-
market institutions that inﬂuence processes of strategic interaction. This division is
understood as a continuum on which countries cluster around the prime examples Germany
and the USA. Although deviations occur within these groups, the Scandinavian countries, the
Continent and Japan are regarded as CMEs, whereas the UK, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand
and Australia complete the group of LMEs. France and other Mediterranean countries are
regarded as mixed cases (Hall/Soskice 2001: 19-21). As a second element of the approach,
Hall and Soskice take up the idea of institutional complementarities. The idea is similar to the
concept of Edgeworth complementarity, which means that two elements (factors) are
complements if employing more of one element increases the marginal returns to employing
more of the other. Transferring this to institutional economics
5, Hall and Soskice (2001: 17)
argue that “two institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or efﬁciency) of
one increases the returns from (or efﬁciency of) the other.” This means that the prevailing,
systematically different modes of coordination in various sub-systems of an economy
5. The transfer of the economic concept of complementarity to institutional economics is to be ascribed to
Aoki’s (1994) treatment of the Japanese ﬁrm. He argues that the main bank system and an imperfect labour
market are institutional complements, which are able to jointly tackle the danger of moral hazard in team-
production.
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relations) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing, systemic way. The concept is
outcome-related meaning that the combined effect of complementary institutions leads to
speciﬁc functional results. These outcomes are related to both company strategies and
workers’ incentives to invest in different degrees of speciﬁcity of human capital. For
instance, comparing the sub-systems of social security and the ﬁnancial system or the
markets of corporate governance, we observe a different picture in a CME and an LME: in a
CME we ﬁnd a bank-based ﬁnancial system, which is able to provide ﬁrms with ‘patient’
capital, meaning that investments are monitored through close relationships to stakeholders in
dense business networks and cross-ownership with overall large block holders of shares, and
not so much through capital markets. This gives ﬁrms opportunities to embark on product
strategies based on incremental innovation of ‘diversiﬁed quality products’ (Streeck 1991).
On the other hand, a social security system characterised by a high employment protection
gives workers an incentive to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skills, which are
needed for this kind of production (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Quite on the contrary, for ﬁrms
in LMEs access to capital is through highly liquid markets, in which investments are secured
through shareholders’ voice or exit. In this market-based ﬁnancial system takeovers are
common disciplinary measures and ﬁrms must be able to frequently produce good short-term
proﬁtability indicators. This creates a situation, in which ﬁrms on the one hand are in a
certain way constrained in that they face more difﬁculties when pursuing longer-term
investments. On the other hand, they are enabled to faster movements into new business
activities and radical innovations. Firms rely mostly on a workforce with general skills and
conduct additional traineeships and in-house training. Complementarily to this, a low
employment protection in the social security system gives incentives for workers to invest in
highly portable and general skills.
The third step the authors take offers far-reaching implications: Hall and Soskice argue that
these complementarities bring about comparative institutional advantage of industries. This
comparative institutional advantage is connected to different types of innovation: the overall
longer-term investment horizon and more consensual model of a CME enables ﬁrms to
pursue strategies that rely on incremental innovation, which is necessary for diversiﬁed
quality production. Complementarily, workers and ﬁrms in CMEs have incentives to invest in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skills. In LMEs the institutional setting characterized by
faster decision-making and ﬁerce competition in various sub-systems generally favours
investment in general skills. This leads to a comparative advantage when it comes to products
based on radical innovation. Accordingly, comparing patents in Germany and the US, Hall
and Soskice (2001: 41-44) observe that German ﬁrms are relatively more active in
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while American ﬁrms are relatively better in areas such as biotechnology, semiconductors or
telecommunication.
1.4 Determinants of institutions
One inﬂuential school of thought of determinants of institutions has already been discussed
above. The Legal Origin approach posits that the main determinant of a host of institutions in
the economy is determined by the legal tradition of a country. This concerns not only investor
protection as discussed above, but extends to labor market institutions (Botero et al. 2004)
and conscription Mulligan and Shleifer 2005 among many others. A recent review (La Porta
et al. 2008) gives an overview of the areas under study. In a nutshell, it is argued that the
legal tradition determines a certain way of doing things, which translates in different kind of
institutions. Common Law countries respond to regulatory challenges rather with more
market-friendly solutions, while Civil Law countries tend to involve the state in solving
problems. Legal Origins has come under considerable attack, speciﬁcally from lawyers.
Spamann (2009) questions the validity of the survey the original investor protection indicator.
His own indicator, which is also based on expert surveys remains only weakly correlated with
the initial by La Porta et al. (1998). Djankov et al. (2008) take some of the criticism to heart
and present an updated and adjusted version. Siems (2007), Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) and
Pistor (2005) question whether the broad distinction of legal families have any explanatory
value at all and suggest looking at speciﬁc legal phenomena that are distinct across legal
systems. One such example is given by the prevalence of good faith and the allocation of
initiation rights in the legal system (Pistor 2005)
A different and somewhat competing approach develops political arguments to explain
determinants of institutions. Both the electoral rules and the form of government have
potential impact on institutional outcomes Persson and Tabellini 2004. Regarding electoral
rules, Pagano and Volpin (2005) model the preferences of managers, workers and investors
and their manifestation under different electoral rules. In a proportional system, which allows
for coalitions of government parties, preferences of workers and managers tend to align
against the preferences of investors. As a result, a coalition is formed granting both
employment protection in the interest of workers and low investor protection, which is in the
interest of managers. On the contrary, a majoritarian system produces single-party
governments, in which a coalition building of managers and worker is not possible.
Empirically, it can be shown that countries with proportional electoral systems show more
labor market rigidity and worse investor protection than countries with majoritarian systems.
Persson and Tabellini 2000 arrive at similar results modeling the incentives of politicians. In
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while in majoritarian system it is often enough to win over certain swing districts. This leads
politicians in proportional systems to propose relatively more universal redistributative
programs than in majoritarian systems. A similar result is found by Austen-Smith 2000:
proportional systems tend to have higher taxes and a ﬂatter distribution of income than
majoritarian systems. This is so, because in a proportional system the preferences of the
electorate with the average worker income is promoted, while in a majoritarian system the
indiviual with the median income of the entire electorate tends to win political representation.
In general, proportional systems are highly connected with more corporatist or coordinated
market economies, while majoritarian systems go together with liberal market economies.
This point is also reiterated in political science literature, see for instance Iversen and Soskice
2006.
In the theoretical literature, the form of government as a second form of political divergence
between countries is less connected to institutional outcomes but more broadly with
incentives to increase the size of government spending. Persson et al. 2000 show that in a
parliamentary system, where the threat of ousting a sitting coalition by a nonconﬁdence vote
is present the coalition in government is forced to show a srong cohesion or party discipline.
In this way the strong position can be sustained. In such a setting a stable majority in the
legislation pursues the interest of the majority of the electorate by increasing spending
programs directed at the broader population (possibly at the cost of the minority). On the
contrary, in presidential systems the government does not face the threat of a non-conﬁdence
vote, which means the the legislation is much less disciplined. As a result, there is less
incentive for broad spending programs, but rather many small spending targeted at speciﬁc
constituencies. Persson and Tabellini (2004) report empirical results in favor of such a claim.
Recently, researchers have begun to rigorously tackle the impact of informal institutions, or
simply ‘culture’ on institutions and economic outcomes. Cultural attitudes inﬂuence
preferences and thereby institutions and constitutions. This, in turn, will have an effect on
economic outcomes such as income or growth (Guiso et al. 2006). The main problem of the
literature is to ﬁnd a workable and comparable deﬁniton of culture. Some employ religion
(McCleary and Barro 2006), trust (Guiso et al. 2006), answers to the World Value Surveys
(Pryor 2005) or develop other indicators of cultural attitudes (Licht et al. 2005, 2007). Also, it
should be noted that cultural attitudes can be expected to inﬂuence not only outcome
variables such as employment protection directly, but through other channels as the political
system, which suggests to use it as instrumental variable. By and large, the evidence of an
impact of culture on institutions is there. Licht et al. (2005) ﬁnd correlations between cultural
attitudes such as the preference for egalitarianism to be correlated with corporate governance
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1.5 Contribution
The contribution of the following three articles is threefold. The ﬁrst article analyzes in depth
the structural claim of comparative institutional advantage made by comparative economic
system approaches such as the varieties-of-capitalism approach. While the fact of divergent
capitalist organization is well known and appreciated and also the the claim that different
types of capitalist systems are capable of producing good macroeconomic outcomes in the
long run seems widely accepted, the idea of comparative institutional advantage runs deeper
and has far-reaching consequences. That is, if comparative institutional advantages of nations
prove to be durable, there is little argument in favor of world-wide convergence of
institutions towards one universal way of doing things. The paper here takes a novel approach
by investigating locational choices of companies in the form of foreign direct investment
(FDI). The hypothesis is straightforward: if a comparative institutional advantage exists, is
can be expected to inﬂuence the locational choice of a ﬁrm. That is, ceteris paribus we would
expect a country to receive more FDI in a given sector if the country possesses an
institutional advantage in this sector. On the basis of sectoral data of German outward FDI in
21 countries it can be shown that depending on the size of a sector, German companies tend
to locate in a country with a comparative institutional advantage. Stated differently, the size
of a sector alone does not inﬂuence company decision, but a large sector with a comparative
advantage receives more FDI.
Having established the importance of comparative institutional differences in terms of
structural outcomes the second and third paper turn to the Central and Eastern European
experience. The second paper conducts an in-depth case study of two countries, Estonia and
Slovenia, with respect to their institutional development in spheres established by Hall and
Soskice (2001) as crucial complementary institutions. The case study develops further
Feldmann’s Feldmann 2006 study of labor market instiutions and industrial relations. It is
similar to Mykhenko 2007, which provides a comparative country study of Poland and the
Ukraine. The result of the country studies is that Estonia developed into a very liberal market
economy with no corporatist features whatsoever, while Slovenia can be characterized with a
coordinated market economy much like Austria or Germany.
The third paper complements the rich institutional description of Estonia and Slovenia by
quantitativly assessing a wider sample of transition countries in terms of competing
determinants of institutions. Put simply, while the second paper answers the question, what
kind of capitalist system emerges in Central and Eastern Europe by use of a case study, the
third paper attempt to answer the question, why did institutions evolve as they did. As
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development. Their inﬂuence on investor protection, labor market institutions and on a
broader measure of coordination is estimated using both cross-sectional and panel data. The
focus is on the type of institutions and not on differences in quality, which would lead to
differences in economic development. In fact, as in many similar studies, the GDP per capita
is an explanatory variable measuring the overall development status of countries. The
advantage of the Central and Eastern European sample is the fact that variation of political
indicators both over time and across countries helps to investigate theories, which have been
mostly applied to stable, mature democratic systems. Results suggest that the political
institution of the electoral system explains the emergence of institutions best with legal
origins having somewhat less explanatory power.
INTRODUCTION 182.  Comparative Institutional Advantage as a determinant of FDI?
Evidence from German sectoral data
Article 1
This paper is joint work with Sang-Min Park and Lena Calahorrano.
2.1 Introduction
The comparative capitalism literature around Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of
Capitalism puts forward a strong claim of comparative institutional advantage. The
institutional set-ups in coordinated (CME) and liberal market economies (LME) are said to
provide ﬁrms with comparative advantages in speciﬁc industries, in which dominating
research patterns are more prominently utilized than others. Speciﬁcally, in LMEs institutions
facilitate radical innovations and hence, ﬁrms have a comparative advantage in the very
industries, which require radical innovation to prosper. On the other end of the spectrum,
CMEs exhibit institutional features, which give the opportunity to engage in more
incremental innovation strategies, which are utilized more in some industries than in others.
The literature provides a considerable number of empirical investigations into the existence
and the extent of comparative institutional advantage. The overall picture is mixed, but taking
everything into consideration there seems to be considerable evidence in favor of
comparative advantage of nations. 
A further logical step for Hall and Soskice (2001) is then to propose a concept of institutional
arbitrage: ﬁrms should exploit existing comparative institutional advantages by shifting
production to countries, where the institutional set-up is best for the activity. Decreasing
barriers to the ﬂow of production factors and goods due to “globalization” make it easier to
shift production to other countries. Apart from “traditional” determinants of foreign direct
investment such as differences in labor cost, market size, transport costs and generally the
distance between countries, the concept of institutional arbitrage implies an institutional
motive for locational production choices of companies.
The empirical literature on the new institutional economics has long introduced institutional
variables in order to explain foreign direct investment and trade patterns. The focus there,
however, is on the quality of institutions in the colloquial sense of the word meaning “good”
institutions. For instance, it can be shown that lower corruption in countries correlates with
higher FDI inﬂows; similarly, the quality of contract enforcement in countries can explain
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project led by the World Bank (2007), which collects worldwide data on institutional
differences in a wide range of areas. These data are then utilized to show the impact of
institutional quality on ﬁnancial development and growth.
The comparative capitalism literature has a different focus: different types of institutions exist
as a result of multiple equilibria with complementary institutions. As stated above, the focus
here is on the different investment incentives provided by different varieties of institutions.
Hence, simply put, institutions in advanced capitalist countries are not better or worse, but
lead to different outcomes with respect to industrial structures and dynamics or distribution of
income. While it can be shown that institutional differences in kind lead to different sectoral
growth rates and investment strategies (Carlin and Meyer 2003), the impact on cross-country
investment and thereby the existence of institutional arbitrage has not been tested empirically,
yet, on a cross-sectoral level. We make a ﬁrst step of doing so using data of German outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) on a sectoral breakdown. We follow the gravity equations
approach, which explains cross-country variation of FDI ﬂows on the basis of market size,
labor costs and distance between host country and the country of origin. In order to model the
institutional set-up of the host-country we include a number of institutional variables ranging
from a simple binary system variable showing whether a host country is classiﬁed as CME or
LME to indicators for speciﬁc institutional sub-systems of the host countries. Hence, the
basic measure says whether countries are liberal market economies or coordinated market
economies. This is amended by continuous measures of degrees of coordination using an
indicator developed by Knell and Srholec (2007) and an expanded and updated version of the
coordination index proposed by Hall and Gingerich (2004). In addition, we include indicators
of industrial relations, corporate governance and labour laws. In a similar fashion as Allen et
al. (2006), we group industrial sectors according to the dominant innovation pattern.
Our analysis suggests that there is a systematic institutional arbitrage to be observed by
German companies. In other words, German companies contemplating relocation do seem to
be inﬂuenced by the institutional endowment of host countries. However, this effect depends
on the size of the receiving sector: larger sectors receive more German FDI if they exhibit a
comparative advantage. If the advantage is not present, the size does not matter.
The analysis proceeds as follows: chapter 2 sets the stage by incorporating the concept of
comparative institutional advantage of the comparative capitalism literature into its usage
within the broader stream of new institutional economics. Against this backdrop, we then
discuss the concept of institutional arbitrage as advocated by Hall and Soskice and give an
overview about the empirical determinants of FDI. Chapter 3 presents our methodology,
which follows widely used empirical methods of international economics to model direction
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while chapter 6 concludes.
2.2 Comparative institutional advantage and foreign direct investment
Comparative advantage refers to lower opportunity cost of production in certain goods and
services. In different strands of trade theory, comparative advantage based on labour
productivity (Ricardo) and relative factor abundance (Heckscher/Ohlin), explains
specialization and the direction of trade. Simply put, ﬁrms specialize in industries, for which
in their respective countries the opportunity costs of producing are lowest and export those
goods. Introducing institutions into the concept of comparative advantage of nations gives
rise to the notion of comparative institutional advantage. It states that institutions (North
1990) provide companies in a given country with comparative advantages in the production
of speciﬁc goods and services (Hall and Soskice 2001, Belloc 2006). For our purposes it is
less relevant, whether countries have comparative or absolute advantages from the
institutional environment. What is more, empirically observing trade or investment patterns
of countries allows to infer a comparative advantage and not an absolute advantage (see also
discussion in Franzese and Mosher 2002).
The theoretical and empirical literature on comparative institutional advantage can be broadly
classiﬁed along two lines. On the one hand, some authors attempt to show that a higher
quality of institutions in one country provides ﬁrms with a better contracting environment
relatively to ﬁrms in a country with lower quality of institutions. This then has an effect on
the whole economy. The second line of research, to which the present paper attempts to make
a contribution, puts the main emphasis on different types of contracting institutions, which
create different institutional environments entailing sectoral comparative advantages.
Including quality differences of institutions in theoretical and empirical studies to explain
growth and development differentials around the world has substantially advanced growth
theories. It has been shown that the quality of institutions, in particular of contracting
institutions, has a long-term impact on the development of countries (Acemoglu et al.
2001, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, North 1990). Also, trade theory is increasingly
incorporating institutions and differences in contract enforcement as a way to reconcile
theoretical predictions with actually observed trade patterns (Belloc 2006).
The theoretical background is provided by institutional economics approaches such as
property rights theory (Hart 1995, Hart and Moore 1990 ) and transaction cost economics
(Williamson 1985 , 2000). There, the unifying feature is the importance of relation-speciﬁc
investments for the choice of speciﬁc types of contractual arrangements. Property rights
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 21literature emphasizes the crucial role of residual control rights in an enterprise. Since
contracts are incomplete, it is the owner who decides over the distribution of total surplus in
cases of ambiguities or imprecision. Hence, there will always be under-investment of the
non-owner as compared to a ﬁrst-best solution. Low quality of contract enforcement in a
country aggravates this because under-investment in relation-speciﬁc assets of non-owners
will be even greater. Ceteris paribus, it is argued that the better the contract enforcement in a
country, the more relation-speciﬁc investments are undertaken. As a consequence, countries
with better contract enforcement (for instance less corruption in the judiciary) enjoy a
comparative institutional advantage in those economic activities, which heavily rely on
relation-speciﬁc investments. Oxley (1999) makes a related observation in a transaction cost
economics framework: the quality of intellectual property rights protection in a host country
has an inﬂuence on the governance choice by the foreign investor: the weaker the protection
the more hierarchical the chosen governance structure.  
Recently, a rapidly growing literature has used trade data to investigate whether trade ﬂows
follow the theoretically predicted lines of comparative institutional advantage. All of them
use similar indicators to capture the differential need for contracting institutions, such as the
contract intensity of industries as proxied by the thickness of input product markets (Nunn
2007), the complexity of products in industries measured by the concentration of input goods
(Levchenko 2007) or survey results about the complexity of tasks in a given industry
(Costinot 2009). They ﬁnd that countries with better contracting institutions export relatively
more of contract-intensive products than countries with worse institutions.
Differences in the quality of ﬁnancial systems can also impact on comparative advantages of
countries otherwise equally endowed (Baldwin 1989, Bardhan and Kletzer 1987). Earlier
theoretical contributions are more broadly echoed in the Law and Finance literature (see an
overview by Beck and Levine 2005 and La Porta et al. 2008). Empirical investigations that
explicitly model comparative advantages arising of better (or worse) ﬁnancial systems
conﬁrm this (e.g. Svaleryd and Vlachos 2005).
Including quality measures of institutions in theoretical and empirical papers in a wide range
of economic applications is commonplace. Less attention has been paid to different types of
institutions, such as different degrees of non-market coordination. This will be discussed in
the following section.
2.2.1  Type of institutions: Varieties of Capitalism
Contributors in this tradition emphasize the point that institutions of coordination can protect
relation-speciﬁc investments and thereby lower the degree of under-investment. That is,
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in incentives to invest in relation-speciﬁc investments. Hence, national institutions affect the
production capacity differently across sectors of the economy.
Tightly coupled with this is the notion of institutional complementarities: simply put, two
institutions are complementary when the existence of one raises the efﬁciency of a second
institution. (Amable 2000, Aoki 2001, Aoki 1994, Hall and Soskice 2001, Höpner 2005). A
related interpretation is that one institution within a domain A can only function efﬁciently,
when a second institution is present in domain B. The mathematical foundation is based on
the notion of super-modularity, which essentially means that elements are linked in discrete
structures.
An encompassing framework within this line of work is provided by the Varieties of
Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). It takes a ﬁrm-
centered view of the economy by analyzing the predominant coordinating device used by
ﬁrms. In liberal market economies (LME) ﬁrms rely predominantly on the use of markets,
hierarchies and arm’s length contracting. In coordinated market economies (CME) there are
additional non-market institutions, which facilitate coordination among companies. Table 2.1
provides a stylized overview of the predominant institutions in CMEs and LMEs.
As already postulated by North (1990), the institutional environment provides incentives, in
what kind of skills and knowledge to invest. While North is primarily concerned with the
development of economies and hence lays great emphasis on the distinction of “good” vs.
“bad” institutions, here the focus is on the type of investment decisions facilitated by the
institutional environment. For Hall and Soskice this is connected to the speciﬁcity of
investments and accompanying innovation strategies. In short, it is argued that in CMEs the
institutional environment gives incentives to invest in highly speciﬁc assets, both for
employees and for ﬁrms. On the contrary, in LMEs individuals will invest comparatively
more in general assets, which can be put to use in a broad range of activities without losing
value. The institutional settings in the sub-system of corporate governance and social security
can serve as an example: in a CME the high protection of both employment and
unemployment of workers gives incentives to invest in speciﬁc human capital on the part of
the workers.
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 23Table 2.1:  Stylized institutional complementarities in CMEs and LMEs
CME LME
Financial System Bank-based Capital market
Corporate Governance Stakeholder Shareholder
Industrial Relations Country-, industry-level Firm-level
Social Security High protection, low ﬂexibility Low protection, high ﬂexibility
Vocational training Speciﬁc human capital Generic human capital
Inter-ﬁrm relations Cooperation Competition
They expect that the appropriation of the quasi-rent of speciﬁc assets, i.e. being ﬁred and
having to accept a job with a different skill proﬁle, is less likely than elsewhere. The
management of the ﬁrm can furthermore commit itself to retaining the workforce during
economic hardships, because the corporate governance system is built around the principle of
‘patient capital’. This means that banks and stakeholders secure credit through dense webs of
cross-shareholding and other monitoring devices (Vitols 2001, 2004). Hence, the company
can pursue investment strategies, which rely on incremental product innovations, such as
diversiﬁed quality production (Streeck 1991). Here, it can be seen that the focus is on
outcomes of institutional complementarities: as a result of “ﬁtting” institutions an innovation
strategy of incremental innovation is feasible. For LMEs, the logic runs the other way: here
employment and unemployment protection is not existent or low, hence employees will
invest in portable, generic skills. They cannot be sure that investment in higher speciﬁcity of
assets would pay off. For the management of ﬁrms in LMEs, it is of utmost importance to be
able to present good performance measures to shareholders. Flexible labor laws make it
possible to ‘hire and ﬁre’, which is one way of achieving good short-term proﬁtability
ﬁgures. Here, the resulting innovation strategies for ﬁrms are radical innovations. Liquid
ﬁnancial markets and hostile takeovers make it easy to move fast into new markets and
change innovation strategies quickly. Also, as stated above, ﬂuid labor markets foster radical
shifts of companies into new business ﬁelds. Hence, institutional complementarities both
constrain and enable actors to engage in particular activities.
To sum up the basic rationale of VoC, the institutional environment in CMEs and LMEs
facilitates different predominant types of assets in both systems. These, in turn, go together
with different innovation strategies. Apart from Germany as the prime example other
European and Asian countries are considered a coordinated market economy, while the
Anglo-Saxon countries form the group of liberal market economies. 
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Apart from that, some countries are not placed in the CME camp, because they lack some
decisive features of it. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and also France are such ‘mixed market
economies’ (Hall and Soskice 2001; Molina and Rhodes 2007). See Table 2.2 for an
overview. Some authors argue that it makes more sense to talk about liberal market
economies and lump everything else into one ‘non-liberal’ group, whose deﬁning feature is
the stark contrast to countries, which predominantly rely on market relationships (cf. in
Streeck and Yamamura 2001).
Having deﬁned sectoral innovation strategies and institutional differences between countries,
it is argued that those innovation strategies give rise to comparative institutional advantages
of nations, because different sectors rely more on one type of innovation than others. The
support from institutional complementarities for certain activities as described above is
different in LMEs from CMEs. It can be expected that this is reﬂected in the structure of the
economy. Hall and Soskice (2001) submit the hypothesis that CMEs are relatively better at
product strategies connected to incremental innovation, such as machine tools, consumer
durables, engines and so on. LMEs, by contrast, are seen as relatively better in activities such
as biotechnology, semiconductors, IT and so on. To provide evidence, Hall and Soskice
provide patent data from the European Patent Ofﬁce for patents from Germany and the US
are used to calculate a specialization index. For the respective country, an industry is listed if
that country specializes in the respective technology ﬁeld. Specialization is given when the
share of patents of a particular industry in total domestic patents is larger than the respective
global share.
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As can be seen from Table 2.3, Germany is specialized in the very areas, which are usually
conferred to as incrementally advanced diversiﬁed quality production. On the other hand,
American ﬁrms are relatively better in industries, which rely on radical innovations.
Taylor (2004) in a ﬁrst step conﬁrms Hall and Soskice’s (2001) classiﬁcation of industries in
either relying on incremental or radical innovation. Extending the analysis over a longer time
span and a larger country set, however, he ﬁnds that the signiﬁcance of results of clear
comparative advantages between Germany and the USA exist hinges on the inclusion of the
United States.
Apart from patents, trade data are also used to map comparative institutional advantage.
Panuescu and Schneider (2004) use the share of high-tech and medium-tech technology
sectors in total exports of a country as a dependent variable. The intuition is that LME
countries will specialize more on high-tech industries with a large R&D-intensity, while
CME countries specialize on medium-tech activities characterized by a lower R&D intensity.
To correct for imports they include the relative advantage of both for a total of 20 countries.
The results are overall supportive for the claim that LMEs specialize in industries dependent
on high R&D expenditures and hence radical innovations, while the comparative advantage
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 26of CMEs of high relative to medium-tech categories is signiﬁcantly lower than for LMEs
(52-55). More rigorously, Allen et al. (2006) and Allen (2006) classify economic activities as
being either based on specialized supplier relations or science-based industries. The former
are associated with incremental innovation strategies, while the later rely on radical
innovation. The authors ﬁnd broad support for VoC’s claim of comparative advantages for all
countries studied by the literature. Watson (2003) in turn, does not ﬁnd support for trade
ﬂows following the pattern of institutional differences using a social-security index and a
size-adjusted trade index of country pairs. Similarly, Beyer (2006) reports mixed results.
Carlin and Mayer (2003) undertake a related approach. They investigate empirically the
relationship between institutions of the ﬁnancial system (such as disclosure requirements),
structural characteristics (such as ownership concentration), and sectoral growth and R&D
investments. Sectors with a high dependence on equity and high skills grow stronger and
display higher R&D expenditures with more information disclosure and higher ownership
concentration. The results suggest that differences in corporate governance systems could
provide comparative advantages for technologies, which require different kinds of funding
and/or commitments.
2.2 Institutional arbitrage
The notion of comparative institutional advantages among nations has strong theoretical
appeal. The empirical record with regard to quality differences of institutions appears to be
strong, while evidence on the impact of types of institutions and systems differences are
mixed. At the same time, international factor movements have increased since the 1980s with
foreign direct investments playing an increasingly strong economic role. In the second half of
the 1990s, FDI inﬂows worldwide grew annually by 40% on average. The worldwide inward
stock of FDI is 23% of the World’s real GDP in 2005 (UNCTAD 2006).
Against this backdrop, the institutional arbitrage hypothesis expects investments to be shifted
to those countries, where the institutional environment and corresponding comparative
institutional advantage suits them best. As multinational corporations (MNCs) can now easier
relocate production to other economies exploiting advantages in resource endowments, factor
costs and market sizes, in addition VoC predicts that it is easier to utilize institutional
differences across countries and accompanying comparative institutional advantages (Soskice
1999:118, Hall and Soskice 2003:248, Hancké et al. 2007). The opportunity of institutional
arbitrage is also much emphasized by the strategic management literature, both in theoretical
elaboration (Porter 1990, 1996, Hoskisson et al. 2004) and strategic advice for companies to
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However, the extent of the opportunity for arbitrage crucially depends on the capacities of the
local sectors. In order for the comparative advantage to play out fully, there has to be an
“industrial tradition” of a sector (Resmini 2000), which provides skilled labor and company
networks. Ideally, sectoral data measuring for instance skill level or skill intensity would be
desirable, but such data do not exist. But. a straightforward way to proxy the strength of a
sector in that respect is to look at the value-added it produces. In general, a sector that
produces a greater value-added can be expected to be of signiﬁcant importance and therefore
possess the institutional capacities needed to fully reap the beneﬁts of a comparative
institutional advantage. So, we will expect the institutional advantage to be most clearly
visible in large and potent sectors rather than niche sectors. Econometrically, as will be
explained in more detail below, this means introducing interaction terms between value-
added and comparative advantage indices. 
Accordingly, in order to test the proposition we will suppose that in addition to traditional
determinants of foreign direct investment location such as distance, labor costs and market
size, the institutional environment should play a decisive role in the investment decision. The
next section introduces the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI.
2.2.2  Determinants of foreign direct investment
FDI activities can be categorized as horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI refers to a
situation when a horizontal stage of the production process is duplicated in a foreign country.
Vertical FDI, in contrast, occurs when the production process is split up and a part of the
production chain is entirely relocated.
In both cases, trade-offs arise, which a ﬁrm contemplating any of the two types of foreign
direct investment must resolve. For horizontal investments the ﬁrm loses economies of scale
on the plant level, because the singular plants become smaller. However, the ﬁrm gains better
market access. In the second case of vertical foreign direct investment costs of disintegration
arise through the split of the production chain. On the other hand, differences of relative
factor supplies, hence cheaper factor costs in the host country, are the potential gain for this
kind of investment. Form the considerations in the previous section it follows that not only
differences in factor endowments but also institutional differences can be seen as
determinants of (vertical) FDI. Both views can also be treated simultaneously in a uniﬁed
model, in which horizontal and vertical FDI are considered special cases (Markusen and
Maskus 2002).
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determinants for horizontal vs. vertical FDI. On the one hand exact classiﬁcation of the type
of investment poses problems, since the distinction is not always clear-cut. Then, theoretical
predictions of the effects of country traits on either type of investment are unclear. Higher
trade costs should encourage horizontal FDI while it should discourage vertical FDI. Larger
markets of the host country will most certainly lead to higher horizontal investment, but it
can also be shown for vertical FDI (Zhang and Markusen 1999). Cheaper factor costs
encourage vertical investments, but no predictions can be made for horizontal.
Apart from that it is very difﬁcult to distinguish between horizontal and vertical types of FDI
from the data. One would need to have detailed data on the destination of sales of host
country afﬁliates, whether they are within the host country, are directed to the home country
or to a third country. Since such data are not available as in our case, we concentrate on the
traditional way to model country determinants using gravity equations. In general, gravity
equations attempt to explain the distribution of FDI across countries mainly by factors such
as distance, GDP and factor costs (see overview in Barba Narvaretti and Venables 2004,
chapter 6). In such a setting, researchers have to live with the fact that their data include both
horizontal and vertical FDI. Traditionally, gravity models were utilized to explain trade ﬂows
and volumes; the ﬁrst application to investments ﬂows is from Eeaton and Tamura (1994).
While in trade theory a recent literature attempts to model institutional diversity of countries
and accompanying comparative institutional advantages in order to explain discrepancy
between theory and empirics of the traditional trade models (see section 2.1), to our
knowledge this has not been done yet in the FDI literature. Studies, which take into account
institutions of the host country focus on FDI ﬂows from advanced countries to developing
and transition countries (Garibaldi et al. 2002, Kinoshita and Campos 2003, Wei 2000, Du et
al. 2008). In contrast, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) have a
broader scope by including also bilateral ﬂows between advanced market economies. What
these studies have in common is that they focus on the quality of institutions by including
World Bank governance indicators or by measuring an institutional distance of quality and do
not explicitly focus on comparative advantages. As explained above, our focus is on
differences of institutional types exempliﬁed by distinctive institutional systems sewn
together by institutional complementarities.
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We estimate the amount of German FDI as a function of a vector of explanatory variables
including both country and sector characteristics. We estimate the size of German (log) FDI
stocks to sector i of country j as a function of country and sector characteristics. We postulate
that FDI should tend to ﬂow to sectors enjoying a comparative advantage in the host country.
The VoC-Dummy is constructed such that it takes the value 1 if the sector has a postulated
comparative advantage, and 0 if not:
Table 2.4 shows which economic activity of the FDI classiﬁcation (according to ISIC Rev. 3)
we classiﬁed as either being favored by a CME and an LME, respectively. The classiﬁcation
follows Allen et al.’s (2006) distinction between radical innovation sectors and incremental
innovation sectors and it is in line with Hall and Soskice’s (2001) results given in Table 3 for
Germany and the USA.
The estimation equation then is:
As stated above, it is expected that the comparative institutional advantage should be
strongest in large sectors. In order to capture that effect, VoC and value-added are introduced
as interaction terms. The coefficient on value-added is assumed to be positive, since a larger
sector should attract more FDI. Also, VoC is expected to enter with a positive sign.
There are two ways to interpret the interaction effect. We expect that ceteris paribus a larger
sector will receive more FDI if the sector enjoys a comparative advantage. A second way to
state the same thing is to expect that the size of the sector is only relevant if the advantage is
actually present. As a result, we will have to interpret the marginal effects if the conditioning
effect of the comparative advantage is present (VoC = 1) and when it is not (VoC = 0). This
implies that the marginal effect of the size of the sector is given by if there is no
comparative advantage. For a sector with an advantage (so VoC = 1) the marginal effect will
be . The marginal effect of moving to a sector with a comparative advantage is given
by   as it depends on the size of the sector.
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D28 Fabricated metal products, except
machinery and equipment
D24 Chemicals and chemical products
D29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. D33 Medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches and clocks
D30 Ofﬁce, accounting and computing
machinery
D353 Aircraft and spacecraft
D31 Electrical machinery and apparatus,
n.e.c
J65 Financial intermediation except insurance
and pension funding
D32 Radio, television and communication
equipment
J 66 Insurance and pension funding, except
compulsory social security
D 34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
J 67 Activities related to ﬁnancial
intermediation
D 35 Other transport equipment K 72 Computer and related activities
D 359 Railroad equipment and transport
equipment n.e.c.
K 73 Research and development
D 36 Manufacturing n.e.c
Note: Based on Allen et al. (2006)
The vector gravity includes the distance to Germany, GDP, GDP per capita and unit labor
costs as controlling variables. The absolute GDP measure the overall market size of the host
country and is expexted to have a positive sign. In order to proxy for overall institutional
capacities and infrastructure, we include GDP per capita of the host country, which is also
expected to enter positively. Unit labor cost differences point at cost considerations of
production and is expected to be negative. We include a vector Z of industry dummies. All
parameters except for the VoC indicator are included as logarithms. In addition to that, in
order to minimize possible multicollinearity, value-added and the VoC indicator are mean-
centered.
2.4 Data
Table 2.5 provides some summary statistics of the sample. Panel A of the table shows overall
summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Panel B shows the countries
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comparative institutional advantage in this country and the number of those that do not. Our
dependent variable represents German outward direct FDI stocks in Euro. The industry-level
data by host country are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank Micro database Direct
Investment (Lipponer 2003). We aggregate ﬁrm-level panel data over the period 1996 to
2001. This transformation into cross-sectional data is justiﬁed because we are examining
systemic aspects of the allocation of German FDI. We thus eliminate time-variation in the
data. 
The Bundesbank measure for FDI differs slightly from the one used by the OECD and the
IMF. The difference between the two measures is that the Bundesbank measure “excludes
loans to shareholders, afﬁliated enterprises and enterprises linked with the party required to
report through participating interests; and claims on shareholders, afﬁliated enterprises and
enterprises linked with the party required to report through participating interests” (reverse
loan capital; see Lipponer 2003: 19). For robustness, we estimate all equations using both
measures. The results do not differ qualitatively, which is why we only report estimations
with the Bundesbank measure. The main explanatory variable of interest – the VoC
indicator – will be operationalized using different measures. The base estimation includes a
binary variable as explained above, where the sector either takes the value one, when it is in a
country, whose type of capitalism ought to facilitate the sector speciﬁc innovation pattern, or
zero if otherwise. In the next section we introduce further measures of system differences as
robustness checks.
GDP per capita is the mean over the period 1996 to 2001 from World Bank (2005). Mean
unit labor costs were calculated as labor compensation over value-added, both from the
STAN database for Industrial Analysis (OECD). Data on geographical distances to Germany
are from Mayer and Zignago (2006).
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A Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 723 8.05 1.86 0.46 13.07
FDI if VoC = 1 311 8.24 1.72 2.11 13.07
FDI if VoC = 0 412 7.90 1.94 0.46 12.51
Value-added 618 8.99 1.63 3.06 13.74
Distance 754 6.83 1.21 5.16 9.84
GDP 754 27.01 1.24 24.82 29.88
GDP p.c. 701 10.11 0.28 9.26 10.62
ULC 576 0.45 0.13 0.02 .70
All variables are in logarithms
B Number of sectors if VoC = 0 Number of sectors if VoC = 1 Total
Australia 4 5 9
Austria 32 17 49
Belgium 46 31 77
Canada 12 18 30
Denmark 30 14 44
Finland 15 10 25
France 36 16 52
Greece 4 1 5
Ireland 5 19 24
Italy 22 13 35
Japan 23 13 36
Korea 5 6 11
Netherlands 39 15 54
New Zealand 0 3 3
Norway 14 11 25
Portugal 3 3 6
Spain 20 12 32
Sweden 26 14 40
Switzerland 36 16 52
UK 21 40 61
USA 19 34 53
Total 412 311 723
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The results of the estimation using OLS are given in Table 6. Columns 1-3 give the results of
different speciﬁcations using the full sample. Columns 4-6 show results for a smaller sample
excluding observations for FDI to Spain, Portugal and Greece. The remaining columns 7-9
list the results, which are obtained including only the “pure” LMEs and CMEs (see Table 2).
In all models, the market size measured by the absolute GDP shows the expected positive
sign. The effect is the largest of all independent variables: for a 1%-increase in GDP, FDI
into a sector increases by approximately 0.5%. The distance to Germany also has the
expected negative sign. Both are highly signiﬁcant throughout all models. The unit labor
costs in a given sector show a small negative coefﬁcient, but it is never signiﬁcantly different
from zero, nor is the coefﬁcient for GDP per capita. Both can be explained by the fact that the
countries in the sample are all comparatively rich countries, which do not differ that greatly
in overall institutional capacity (proxied by GDP per capita) and productivity (proxied by unit
labor cost). We observe that the size of the receiving sector proxied by the value-added of the
sector has the expected sign, but it is not signiﬁcant when entered in models 2, 5 and 8,
respectively. The interpretation in models 3, 6 and 9, however, must take into account the
introduction of the interaction effect.
The marginal effect of the size of the sector on FDI is given by the coefﬁcient on value-added
alone only if VoC is equal to zero. Hence, we can already conclude that the size of the sector
does not seem to play a role if the sector does not enjoy a comparative advantage: the
coefﬁcient is never signiﬁcantly different from zero. It does not make much sense to interpret
the coefﬁcient on VoC in isolation in models 3, 6 and 9, because that would mean that value-
added were zero. For the sake of argument, however, we see that the comparative advantage
does not seem to inﬂuence the decision to invest in a particular sector, if that sector is small.
The interesting interpretation comes from looking at the joint effect. The coefﬁcient of the
interaction effect is positive and signiﬁcant. It is larger and attains a higher signiﬁcance level
when Spain, Portugal and Greece are excluded, which to a certain extent fulﬁll expectations
we had about those countries. The fact that none of the coefﬁcients of the other variables
change greatly after the introduction of the interaction term, lends belief to the claim that this
is a genuine effect not driven by possible multicollinearity or by a large signiﬁcant effect by
one inﬂuencing variable that would overlie the effect of the other. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
full sample excluding Spain, Portugal and











































































































































Obs. 554 554 554 511 511 511 428 428 428
R² 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
F 11.17*** 11.22*** 11.85*** 10.69*** 10.73*** 11.55*** 16.77*** 15.97*** 14.51***
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include industry dummies. All variables except VoC are in log form and have been
normalized between 0 and 1. Value-added and VoC have been mean-centered.
Table 2.6 reports the coefﬁcient of the joint effect if VoC=1 and corresponding standard
errors. It is signiﬁcant in models 3, 6 and 9. Accounting for comparative advantage, the size
of the sector matters: ceteris paribus, for a 10% increase in value-added a sector receives
about 3% more FDI if the sector has a comparative advantage. If we take the coefﬁcients at
face value, this effect is smaller than the effect of the total market size, but it is larger in
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 35absolute terms than the effect of the distance of a country.
A similar interpretation can be put forward looking at the marginal effect of comparative
advantage. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of a sector with a comparative advantage,
which is conditioned by the size of the sector. The left-hand diagram shows the effect from
model 3, which uses the entire sample, while the right-hand side reports results from model 6.
The dashed line in both graphs show the upper and lower bounds of a 95%-conﬁdence
interval. The graph for model 9 is similar to the one shown for model 3.
It can be seen from the graphs in Figure 2.1 that the effect of the comparative advantage
increases as the sector size increases and that it is not signiﬁcant for small sectors. So for
investments in relatively small sectors the advantage does not matter. A careful comparison
of the two graphs reveals that the effect “frays” less for the sample excluding Spain, Portugal
and Greece as the value-added increases, which is reﬂected in the higher signiﬁcance in Table
6.
Taken together, the data suggest that German multinationals do follow the comparative
advantage of a receiving sector when making investment decisions. This depends crucially on
the size of a sector. However, the results also suggest that for medium sized sectors this effect
does not trump “traditional” gravity-equation explanatory variables such as market size and
the distance. 
Panel A Panel B
Figure 2.1: Marginal effect on FDI if the sector enjoys a comparative advantage depending on different sector
sizes. Panel A shows the effect for model 3 and Panel B for model 6.
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and home country. As opposed to the binary indicator that takes values 0 and 1, these are
indicators that vary between 0 and 1. Hence, these indicators can capture different degrees of
suitability of institutions. Table 7 shows for each of the additional indices the results for the
full sample excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain and the core sample of LMEs and CMEs.
In other words, Table 7 shows the models that correspond to models 6 and 9 in Table 6. 
First, shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, we use a measure constructed from an updated
coordination index following Hall and Gingerich (2004). It is a composite index including
indicators for the institutional spheres of industrial relations and corporate governance. The
index is the outcome of a factor analysis using measures of centralization of wage bargaining,
job tenure, the size of stock market, dispersion of control and shareholder power
6. In columns
3 and 4, we base our measure on the coordination index provided by Knell and Srholec
(2007), which is also the outcome of a factor analysis, but with a slightly different focus than
Hall and Gingerich’s. Their coordination index is comprised of indicators from the spheres of
social systems, labor markets and business regulation. For the two composite indices the
results are fairly similar. In models 2 and 4 the sign of the interaction effect is not signiﬁcant
anymore, but the joint effect reaches some signiﬁcance for model 2, while it is not signiﬁcant
in model 4. The economic effect here is somewhat smaller than in the models using the
binary indicator.
As a last step we undertake a robustness test by using institutional indicators for single
spheres of the economy instead of global systems indicators. Hence, in order to check
whether there are any differences when looking at complementarity “unbundled”, we split up
our updated coordination index on the basis of Hall and Gingerich (2004) into its two
elements: industrial relations (models 5 and 6) and corporate governance (models 7 and 8).
Also, in order to check whether labor market regulation alone might account for the sectoral
distribution of foreign direct investment, we include Botero et al.’s (2004) labor law index,
which is shown in columns 9 and 10. Unbundling the composite index shows that industrial
relations and corporate governance indicators have a higher impact on the marginal effect of
sector size than the composite indices. 
6. We extend the indicator by the countries missing in their sample and use the updated version of the
antidirector index from Djankov et al. (2008) as opposed to the earlier one from La Porta et al. (1998) as Hall
and Gingerich’s shareholder power index. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of value-added for different degrees of correspondence with comparative
institutional advantage
In addition this effect stays signiﬁcant, albeit economically smaller, when the mixed market
economies are excluded. The highest effect seems to stem from labor laws. For a 10%
increase in value-added of a sector, FDI into this sector increases by roughly 3 - 4%
depending on the chosen sample. This is effect holds only when the labor laws in the country
fully correspond to the claimed comparative advantage. 
Since the indicator is not a binary one, but takes values between 0 and 1, we can visualize the
effect of intermediate values in Figure 2.2. It shows the marginal effect of value-added (and
corresponding upper and lower conﬁdence bounds) for different values of the labor law
index. A straightforward interpretation of the horizontal axis is that as one moves to the right
the correspondence with postulated comparative advantages increases. As expected, the
marginal sectoral size effect increases in correspondence.
2.6 Conclusion
The analysis in the paper suggests that there are institutional arbitrage arguments involved in
the locational investment decision of ﬁrms. Controlling for “traditional” gravity-equation
determinants of FDI on both country and sector level, we ﬁnd that a sector, which in a given
country enjoys a comparative advantage due to the institutional surroundings receives a
larger chunk of German FDI than a sector without this advantage. This effect depends on the
size of the sector: if the comparative advantage is present, a larger sector receives more FDI.
On the other hand, the size of a sector is shown to be irrelevant if there is no comparative
advantage. This effect has been shown to be robust to several speciﬁcations and a
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 39considerable number of operationalizations of institutional advantage. Of course, a wider
cross-country set of FDI data involving more home countries than only Germany seems
desirable. In general, a sample of bilateral FDI stocks with detailed information on the actual
activity undertaken, such as subsidiary sales, could help to better identify multinational
strategies. In such a setting, it would be possible to disentangle horizontal and vertical FDI
along the lines of the model by Markusen and Maskus (2002). To our knowledge, such data
of investment do not exist on a detailed sectoral level. However, that fact that companies
from a sample of ﬁrms from the biggest European economy do seem to engage partly in
institutional arbitrage makes a fairly strong point. 
The comparative institutional economics and capitalism literature can help to explain how
speciﬁc industries or production methods are more likely to be found in some countries rather
than others. Taken one step further, we show that by way of institutional arbitrage the effect
translates into international investment decisions as well. In a broader context still, the
institutional arbitrage argument lies at the heart of a notion of persistent divergence of
institutional systems. That is, if globalization makes international capital movements easier,
institutional arbitrage should cement institutional differences and not erode them, because
country competition for capital investments would not occur in such a scenario.
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF FDI? 403.  East European Antipodes: Varieties of Capitalism in Estonia and 
Slovenia
Article 2
This paper is published as
Buchen, C. (2007) Estonia and Slovenia as Antipodes. In Varieties of Capitalism in Post-
Communist Countries, (Eds, Lane, D. & Myant, M.) Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, New
York, pp. 65-89.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of Estonia and Slovenia along the lines of the
Varieties of Capitalism framework (Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). Both countries
have been identiﬁed as polar opposites against the backdrop of Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC). As demonstrated in the chapter by Mark Knell and Martin Srholec in a quantitative
study Estonia and Slovenia can be seen as Antipodes regarding their institutional
conﬁgurations. They come out at both ends of a spectrum of transition economies according
to the degree of non-market coordination. This is corroborated by Magnus Feldmann (2006),
who analyzes industrial relations of both countries and comes to the conclusion that Estonia
and Slovenia can be seen as the incarnations of a liberal and coordinated market economy.
Hence, this chapter takes up these results and attempts to conﬁrm them in a continuative
analysis. This will be carried out in two ways: ﬁrstly, the study of industrial relations will be
complemented by additionally analyzing institutions in further four determining sub-systems
of a speciﬁc variety of capitalism, namely corporate governance, inter-ﬁrm relations, social
security and vocational training systems (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001).
Secondly, the chapter will attempt to illuminate a further implication of the VoC literature,
which is the concept of comparative institutional advantages. There, it is argued that speciﬁc
systems by means of institutional complementarities among sub-systems lead to distinct
incentives to invest in different degrees of asset speciﬁcity. This, in turn, opens up
institutional comparative advantages in different economic sectors according to different
innovation patterns. From this it follows that ﬁrms and workers in coordinated market
economies (CME) are relatively better at producing goods and services which entail
incremental innovation. On the contrary, in liberal market economies (LME) the comparative
advantage lies within sectors, which largely rely on radical innovation. This helps to explain
economic structures of countries, which eventually can be traced back to institutional
complementarities. Hence, the qualitative analysis of possible institutional complementarities
in Estonia and Slovenia will by complemented by also studying emerging comparative
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patterns of foreign direct investment into both countries with sectoral and geographical
distribution.
Estonia and Slovenia provide excellent cases for comparison for the VoC framework. Not
only do they show divergent institutional frameworks, but also both countries display
similarly good macroeconomic outcomes. In fact, this statement is crucial, because one
central tenet of VoC is that it predicts equally good macroeconomic performance for
countries of different variants of capitalist coordination (Hall and Soskice 2001: 20-1;
Amable 2003: 213-24). It will be shown that in terms of GDP and unemployment both
countries exhibit above average ﬁgures in the transition world.
The analysis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 ﬁrst brieﬂy introduces macroeconomic
performance of both countries and then states which institutions have to be studied in order to
be able to trace institutional complementarities as proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001). This
task is then accomplished in the second part of chapter 2. Subsequently, in chapter 3
comparative institutional advantages will be assessed as further evidence of emerging
institutional complementarities.
3.2 Estonia and Slovenia as LME and CME
Both Estonia and Slovenia managed to perform very well in the transition process being
above the average of transition countries regarding growth and unemployment ﬁgures.
Comparing Estonian and Slovenian catch-up processes one can observe the following picture
in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 reveals that particularly Slovenia quickly managed to regain pre-transition GDP
levels, the former output level was restored as early as 1997. In Estonia this process took
longer, the previous level could not be achieved until 2003. From 1997 onwards both
countries are above the average of the transition countries as a whole. Comparing both
countries with the more relevant group of the new EU member states and three candidate
countries Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, the picture is similar, albeit less clear in the
Estonian case: Estonia manages to catch up with the rest only in 2001.
Similarly, according to unemployment ﬁgures, again Estonia and Slovenia show very good
results in comparison with other EU members and candidates. Figure 3.2 depicts the
development of unemployment rates from the mid-nineties until 2003 for both countries and
again as an average. The latter group reveals larger unemployment than both Estonia and
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Figure 3.1: Real GDP (1989 = 100) in Estonia; Slovenia; as an average of the remaining Central and Eastern
European EU Member States and candidate countries Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia; and as an average of all
transition countries (EBRD 2002, 2004, ﬁgures for 2003 based on growth estimates)
Figure 3.2: Unemployment (in per cent of labour force) for Estonia, Slovenia and as an average of the remaining
Central and Eastern European EU Member States and candidate countries Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia
(EBRD 2002, 2004, ﬁgures for 2003 based on estimates)
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Inter-company networks, strategic 
cooperation (vocational training, R&D)
Inter-ﬁrm relations Standard market-relationships
Both high employment protection and 
high unemployment protection 
Social security Both low employment protection and low 
unemployment protection.
Dual apprenticeship system fosters ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skills
Vocational training Traineeships and in-house training of 
general skilled labour
Sources: Hall/Soskice 2001: 21-33; Thelen 2001 ; Vitols 2001, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001.
This assessment can be corroborated further by looking at competitiveness ﬁgures issued by
the World Economic Forum: its 2004 report (Porter et al. 2004 ) ranks both Estonia and
Slovenia highest of all transition economies under study in the “Growth Competitiveness
Index” and the “Business Competitiveness Index”. Thus, it is safe to say that the two
countries are above-average performers among transition countries in CEE.
At the same time, Estonia and Slovenia are associated with opposing approaches to the
transition process: while Estonia is commonly seen as a very radical and fast (“big bang”)
reformer (cf. Smith 2001), Slovenia’s way of reforms can be described as more gradual and
slow (cf. Mencinger 2004 ). Accordingly, both countries are good transition reformers with
apparently diametrically opposed approaches and outcomes. 
VoC covers analyses of institutions in ﬁve sub-systems as indicated in Table 3.1 for the
prime examples Germany and the USA. Hence, in a qualitative analysis institutional
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relations, corporate governance, inter-ﬁrm relations, social security systems and vocational
training will be examined.
The analysis emphasises current institutional settings in both countries. Initial institutional
conditions and legacies are not more than mentioned in passing. The goal of linking systemic
institutional outcomes to origins seems promising, but goes beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2.1  Industrial relations
Trade unions, employers and wage-bargaining
Industrial relations in socialism were fundamentally different from what is traditionally
known in western economies. Trade unions were perceived as part of the regime, and usually
not rooted on ﬁrm levels. From this it follows that reputation of unions was generally bad
7,s o
that a drop in membership after the dismantling of the system was inevitable (Boeri and
Terrell 2002). Correspondingly, membership ﬁgures in both Estonia and Slovenia dropped
sharply, in Estonia from 93 per cent of workers unionized in 1990 to 14 per cent in 2000, and
in Slovenia from 69 per cent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 2001. However, Slovenian ﬁgures are
the highest of all CEE countries (Ladó 2002).
In Estonia there are two umbrella organizations, which represent several smaller unions.
These are the Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions (Eesti Ametiühingute Keskliit, EAKL),
the successor of Soviet time with 26 members representing a total of about 58.000 workers,
and Estonian Employees’ Unions’ Confederation (Teenistujate Ametiliitude
Keskorganisatsioon, TALO), joint organization for 11 unions and 40.000 workers. Apart
from these, the Farmers’ Union has about 9.600 members. On the employers’ side we ﬁnd the
Estonian Employers’ Confederation (Eesti Tööandjate Keskliit, ETTK) which represents a
mere 4 per cent of ﬁrms (Feldmann 2006). There are both tripartite and bipartite agreements.
The former include the state, unions and employers and mainly deal with minimum wages
and overall working conditions. Bipartite collective wage agreements are not very far-
reaching: in the year 2003 eleven out of 37 unions came to conclude an agreement, meaning
that 28 per cent of workers were covered by a collective agreement. At the same time
agreements on ﬁrm levels are the most common. The Ministry of Social Affairs encourages
social partners to reach bilateral agreements, but at the same time explicitly underlines their
voluntary character (Philips and Eamets  2003a). 
In Slovenia, there are 6 umbrella associations, whereby the leading role is played by the
7.  Polish Solidarność being an exception.
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Svobodnich Sindikatov Slovenije, ZSSS) which represents about half of the organised
workforce. This ﬁgure has shown to be stable throughout the 1990s. Further 17 independent
unions exist. The most inﬂuential employers’ organization is the Slovenian Chamber of
Commerce, to which membership is compulsory (Stanojević 2000). Also, a law from the
ﬁnal years of Yugoslav federalism concerning wage bargaining legislation makes agreements
between unions and employers compulsory. This, together with compulsory membership in
the Chamber of Commerce creates a situation, in which almost 100 per cent of the workforce
is covered by up to three collective agreements. A new law, which by 2005 still is in
parliamentary process would most certainly reduce this high ﬁgure, because compulsory
agreements are against the guidelines of both ILO and EU (Skledar 2005). Apart from the
large importance of collective wage-bargaining other institutions point at a strong corporatist
culture in Slovenia. The National Council exists among the National Assembly (parliament)
as a second chamber composed of representatives according to functional representation. It
consists of regional delegates and representatives from different interest groups, such as
employers, employees, farmers and others. Although the Council’s formal power remains
rather small, it is seen to fulﬁl a supervisory function and counterbalance the party
representation in the National Assembly. Furthermore, there is an Economic-Social Council
as a tripartite body with growing inﬂuence on setting standards with respect to economic and
social policies (Lukšič 2003). 
To sum up, while in Slovenia we ﬁnd a corporatist culture with strong employers’
associations and unions with far-reaching wage agreements, in Estonia the opposite is true:
neither employers nor workers are formally organized. Additionally, the large majority of
wages are set on ﬁrm-levels. Complementarily to this, on the ﬁrm level we expect to ﬁnd
considerable workers’ participation in the Slovenian case.
Worker participation
In Estonia, ﬁrst experimental reform measures were taken in the second half of the 1980s.
Workers’ councils were founded in a number of ﬁrms. Following independence these projects
lost signiﬁcance very fast, councils split off along ethnic lines of Estonians and ethnic
Russians, when the independence movement became the dominating issue. “Soviet
experiments” were discredited and eventually dropped (Wielgohs 2001). Nowadays workers’
councils or any other form of co-determination do not play any signiﬁcant role anymore
(Feldmann 2006).
By contrast, in Slovenia, workers’ councils have considerable inﬂuence, a fact that can be
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self-management ﬁrms’ autonomy in the Yugoslav system was substantially increased and at
the same time workers’ involvement in the decision-making process of ﬁrms increased. In
1993 the system was transformed into a system of councils modelled on the example of
German Betriebsräte. Works councils in Slovenia are very important entities for unions,
because they allow to root union power on the ﬁrm levels (Stanojević 2001). Today, in the
majority of ﬁrms works councils exist (Stanojević 2003: 288).
This brief overview of industrial relations in both countries has shown that in this sphere
Estonia and Slovenia can be regarded as polar opposites, as Antipodes. While in Estonia we
ﬁnd ﬁrm-level wage-setting accompanied by weak unions and employers organizations,
wage-bargaining in Slovenia is conducted industry-wide and both unions and employers are
strongly cohesive. This is in line with the institutional complementarities postulated by VoC.
The next chapter looks at the sub-section of corporate governance in Estonia and Slovenia.
3.2.2  Corporate governance
The creation of private property is the most fundamental challenge former communist states
are facing on their journey from socialism to capitalism. Apart from new companies
emerging after liberalization measures, privatization has had a decisive impact on the
formation of a new ownership structure of former state-owned companies and thereby on
corporate governance. In the following we look at the resulting ownership structure, the way
management is organized and stakeholders are represented and at market capitalization
ﬁgures.
Ownership structure
Estonian privatization can be characterized by two distinct phases. While in the ﬁrst phase
privatization clearly favoured insiders, the second was dominated by direct sales with equal
treatment of foreigners. Starting with reform measures during Gorbachev era, a considerable
number of small private ﬁrms and co-operatives was established. Later, ‘leasing’ of ﬁrms was
introduced, and from October 1990 onwards it was possible to sell off 20 per cent of a ﬁrm to
employees. Following the introduction of the Estonian Kroon (1992) a small privatization
scheme was established, which was modelled on the East-German Treuhandanstalt. This
meant a step away from initial employee-favouring forms of privatization. During this second
phase small privatization proceeded fast, so that all small enterprises subject to privatization
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newly founded agency. Especially, equal treatment of foreign investors was secured (Mygind
1997: 40-44 ). The applied method of direct sales during the second, and larger, wave of
privatization is still visible in the high ownership concentration: on average the largest
shareholder in Estonia holds 56.2 per cent of shares, while the second and third largest are
relatively small holding 9 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively (Berglöf and Pajuste 2003).
While the beginning of privatization fostered formation of employee ownership, throughout
the 1990s numbers of employee-controlled companies continuously decreased. Another
direct consequence of the privatization is a strong foreign ownership of about 25 per cent of
shares (Kalmi  2003).
In Slovenia the Law on Ownership Transformation of 1992 laid the legislative basis for
privatization. During the course of privatization vouchers were issued in size of 40 per cent
of GDP. In the privatization process 40 per cent of the capital of a ﬁrm had to be transferred
to three state-controlled funds (SCFs), 20 per cent to employees, while for the remaining 40
per cent there were two options: they could be sold either to employees or directly to the
public. The majority of ﬁrms chose the internal method by allocating this remaining share to
insiders. Hence, in Slovenia a mixed scheme of voucher and management and employee buy-
outs (MEBO) was carried out, whereby the latter was insider-biased in practice. The actual
method of privatization can be seen as a political compromise between left-wing parties
favouring insider buy-outs and right-wing parties supporting a voucher scheme (Šušteršič
2004: 403). Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs) were founded to exert active control.
Today’s ownership structure (of ﬁrms listed on Ljubljana Stock Exchange end of 2000) still
reminds of Slovenia’s privatization method: 25 per cent of ﬁrms are held by PIFs or their
successors, 16 per cent by insiders, the same amount by SCFs, and 15 per cent by ﬁrms. 12
per cent of shares are held by small investors.
On average the largest owner controls 32 per cent of shares, with 15 per cent and 11 per cent
for the second and third largest investor. The average coalition voting block of the three
largest owners in over 70 per cent of ﬁrms amounts to 62 per cent. This ﬁgure is close to
Austrian and German percentages (Gregorič 2003: 33ff.). In this relatively dense corporate
network with considerable cross-ownership the central role is played by various state funds.
It is widely held that initial privatization methods were planned considering both political
acceptability and speed of transformation. Therefore, it can be expected that initial ownership
structures will be changing during transformation when ‘true’ owners with an economic
interest will acquire shares of companies. Thus, further insight is gained by also considering
changes in ownership.
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per cent between the end of the privatization process and 2001 including both privatised and
new companies (Jones and Mygind 2005). Additionally, the percentage of domestic
investors controlling ﬁrms fell more modestly from about 31.5 per cent to 25per cent.
Manager-owned ﬁrms spread continuously over the years, from 24 per cent to 34 per cent.
Foreign control remained fairly unchanged at about 25 per cent (Kalmi 2003: 1222).
In Slovenia SCFs on aggregate decreased their stakes by about half in the period from
1998-2002. Shares of domestic ﬁrms more than tripled. Shares held by PIFs, banks, managers
and minority holders remained unchanged, while foreign stakes doubled coming from a very
low level. The number of ﬁrms in which insiders constitute the dominant group dropped from
50 per cent of ﬁrms in 1998 to about 18 per cent in 2002, while the overall aggregate
ownership stakes of insiders remain fairly high at 26.8 and 26.2 per cent in 2001 and 2002.
The amount of ﬁrms with SCFs as dominant holders remained unchanged. Cases where
domestic ﬁrms act as dominant owners of other ﬁrms increased from 11 per cent to 33 per
cent. (Damijan et al. 2004 ). Here we can observe a consolidation process: SCFs seem to
concentrate on ﬁrms where they have a dominant position, while domestic non-ﬁnancial
companies increase their voting power. Insiders are slowly withdrawing from enterprise
control, but also seem to consolidate. It is interesting to note that the ownership share of
insiders (managers excluded) in Slovenia has a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on
management decision power (Prasnika and /Gregoric  2002).
Organization of management
In 1995 the new Commercial Code brought far-reaching changes for Estonian enterprises. A
two-tier board structure was introduced, which is based on the German model with
management board and supervisory board (Gerndorf et al. 1999). Like Estonia, Slovenia
adopted a two-tier board structure as well, following legislation in 1993 (Bohinc and
Bainbridge 1999).
Representation of stakeholders
The Estonian Commercial Code does not deﬁne the composition of the supervisory board in
detail: Representation of workers and other interested groups is not compulsory and generally
does not occur (Gerndorf et al. 1999: 13). Shareholders holding more than 50 per cent of
shares have the right to unilaterally appoint the supervisory board.
In Slovenia, workers participate in both supervisory boards and management boards. In
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workers’ representatives, whereas in ﬁrms with more than 500 employees at least one third of
the supervisory board is appointed by workers, except for ﬁnancial institutions. Moreover,
one representative – the “workers’ director” – can be part of the management board. Workers
and the ﬁrm agree on a contract of participation rights, which includes information obligation
on part of the management, consultation, co-determination and workers’ veto rights on
personnel decisions (Prašnikar and Gregorič 2002: 274 f.). Pahor et al. (2004) study a
representative sample of companies with respect to composition of supervisory boards: in
about 22 per cent of companies employees take up more than half of the board seats.
Representatives of state funds are present in about one third of companies. 
Market capitalization
The Estonian stock-market is considerably larger than the Slovenian, it reaches 41,7 per cent
of GDP in 2003 as compared to 14,6 per cent in Slovenia. Moreover, the Estonian stock-
market capitalization is the highest of all eight CEE latest accession countries to the
European Union. However, the Estonian value is still much smaller than corresponding
values for typical LMEs as the UK and the USA. Also, the turnover ratio, i.e. the value of
shares actually traded is much lower in Estonia (EBRD 2004).
Comparing our results with practice prevailing in the UK, an LME, and Germany, a CME,
we observe the following picture in Table 3.2. Two observations catch the eye: ﬁrst of all the
striking similarities between Slovenia and Germany regarding management organization and
representation of stakeholders clearly conﬁrms the view of Slovenia as a CME. In both areas
legislation was modelled on the German example. Looking at ownership structure we ﬁnd
legacies of post-socialist reforms, though: considerable shares held by insiders and state-
controlled funds. Banks do not play any signiﬁcant role in corporate governance apart from
inﬂuence exerted through bank-owned PIFs (Gregorič 2003). Taken together, this is clearly a
deviation from western CME-type corporate governance coordination. With regards to state
inﬂuence Pahor et al. (2004) examine emerging company networks with regard to ownership
and control patterns (seats on supervisory boards). They come to the conclusion that direct
state inﬂuence in the economy remains within the two types of state-run funds. Stated
differently, in order to eradicate state control entirely dissolution of these funds would
sufﬁce.
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Two-tier board structure 
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The second observation is not that straightforward, on the contrary, the Estonian picture
seems highly inconsistent with VoC. On the one hand Estonia has the biggest capital market
in CEE and representation of stakeholders is voluntary. This does not go well together with
large ownership concentration and German-type two-tier board structure. However, looking
at practice, we discover deviations from the stakeholder model. Gerndorf et al. (1999) report
that in daily practice supervisory boards are often circumvented when it comes to decision-
making
8. It is perceived as overly bureaucratic. Moreover, the high concentration of
ownership allows circumvention of the system by carefully choosing members of the
supervisory board.
Generally speaking, the introduction of a market-based system of corporate governance right
away from the beginning of the transition process does not seem feasible. Berglöf and Bolton
(2002) ascribe this to weak and not credible protection of small shareholders, a lack of
experts in ﬁrms and banking, costly information gathering, and a comparably risky business
environment. Additionally, Djankov and Murrell (2002 ) ﬁnd that when it comes to enterprise
restructuring a concentrated ownership delivers better results than dispersed ownership.
8. In this case one should not assume this to be an institution, because it is not perceived as one by actors
(Aoki 2001: 13). However, in this case anecdotal evidence is reported, hence, thorough empirical evaluation
would be needed to clarify matters.
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evolve early after the change of system. Also, in the Estonian case, the chosen privatization
method just could not lead to dispersed shares of companies.
The divergent dealing with insiders in the Estonian and Slovenian case is remarkable: while
in Estonia the initial insider-favouring conditions of privatization were replaced with a model
of direct sales to outsiders, the insider-biased approach of Slovenia lasted throughout the
whole process. Accordingly, as already mentioned above, employee ownership dropped
sharply in Estonia in time. In Slovenia, ﬁgures also decreased, but seem to consolidate on a
higher level. If we assume that employee ownership can be an incentive to acquire ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills (Blair 1999) the comparison of Estonia and Slovenia as opposites has in store
potential transitional institutional complementarities. In this case employee-owners could be
a functional equivalent (Crouch et al. 2005: 375) to an efﬁcient banking system in a post-
communist CME. As seen above, the Slovenian banking sector is not in the position to grant
‘patient capital’ to companies, whose managers cannot credibly commit themselves to retain
the workforce in economic downturns. Then, the equivalent incentive for workers to acquire
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital can be owning shares of the company and thereby assuming
responsibility. Accordingly, in Slovenia a far larger portion of ﬁrms was and still is in the
hands of employees, while in Estonia the initial preferential treatment of employees was
abandoned. Prasnikar and Gregoric (2002) report that insider ownership does not necessarily
lead to “employeeism’ (Nuti 1997) in Slovenia, while in the Estonian case one can speak in
parts at least of degeneration of employee ownership (Kalmi 2003). However, one has to bear
in mind that this complementary institution can be efﬁcient as a “transitional institution”
(Qian  2003), but it could vanish while the economy matures.
In sum, while in Slovenia we ﬁnd a stakeholder approach to corporate governance with
insiders and state inﬂuence, analysis of the Estonian case reveals a somewhat imperfect
stakeholder approach to corporate governance, or stated differently, the Estonian model
seems to be neither a pure shareholder nor a perfect stakeholder approach.
3.2.3  Inter-ﬁrm relations
Due to strong state control, in socialist countries comparable kinds of inter-company relations
did not exist. R&D was centrally conducted by planning authorities, which also decided, in
which sectors which technology for which production should be used (Kornai 1992).
Moreover, any kind of horizontal informational ﬂows did not ﬁt into the logic of the whole
EAST EUROPEAN ANTIPODES: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM IN ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA 52system (Ericson  1991).
After removal of the planning system ﬁrms had to ﬁnd ways how to cooperate. In Estonia, no
signiﬁcant attempts to cooperate “beyond the market” were made; following VoC this is not
necessary and not possible, due to lack of encompassing business organizations. When it
comes to CMEs, Goodin (2003: 208-212) remarks that trust is a precondition for the building
of committed cooperation between ﬁrms. For many ﬁrms had to build up completely new
relationships with new business partners following the breakdown of ﬁrms and markets in
CEE, it is not surprising that in Slovenia trust is not well developed yet
9 (Czaban et al.
2003 ). Nevertheless, institutional infrastructure enabling cooperation is given by the strong
presence of chambers and business associations.
3.2.4  Social security systems
Before turning to the contemporary situation in both countries under study, it is useful to ﬁrst
depict peculiarities within this system during socialist rule. In socialism the state fulﬁlled a
paternalistic function. It gave a job guarantee for every citizen, and losing one’s job rarely
happened. Therefore, employment protection (EP) was very high in socialism. Firms were
also involved in other welfare activities by providing kindergarten, health care or vacation
facilities. On the other hand, unemployment protection (UP) was low for citizens, who were
not part of the workforce, apart from subsidies on rents and basic food (Götting 1998:
57-88 ). Thus, the task for transitional economies was to change labour legislation to more
market-based rules and to institutionalize a system of UP.
Employment protection
To compare LMEs and CMEs, Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) calculate an index consisting of two
OECD-indexes, employment protection legislation (EPL), which captures the restrictiveness
of individual hiring and ﬁring rules for regular employments, and collective dismissals
protection. As a third indicator they construct an index of company-based protection (see
Table 3.3 for explanations). With the help of these three indexes an overall index of
employment protection is calculated as a weighted average. In Table 3.3 I calculate this index
for Estonia and Slovenia using ﬁgures for EPL and collective dismissals protection
legislation estimated by Riboud et al. (2002 ). We then compare it with results for the USA
(LME) and Germany (CME). For Slovenia two ﬁgures are given to capture changes
associated with a new Labour Code that came into force January 1st 2003.
9. However, more recent data is needed to assess this more accurately, for Czaban et al. (2003) report
research conducted in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.

















UK 0.8 2.9 1 0.18
Estonia 3.1 4.1 1 0.44
Germany 2.8 3.1 3 0.59
Slovenia 2.9 (3.4)
c 4.9 (4.8) 3 (3) 0.67 (0.71)
a) based on the following criteria: (a) presence of employee-elected bodies with a signiﬁcant role in manpower
decisions, (b) existence of strong external unions with some monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and (c) use of
employee sharing practices like job-sharing or job-rotation. Where at least two criteria are met, a ‘3’ is assigned,
and a ‘1’ where none is present. A ‘2’ for mixed cases (Estevez-Abe et. al 2001: 166). Due to the existence of
workers’ councils and strong unions I assigned a ‘3’ for the Slovenian case, the absence of both in Estonia
allows a value of ‘1’. To my knowledge job-rotation and similar practices are not practiced in the transition
world.
b) weighted average of columns 1-3; the weights are 5/9, 2/9 and 2/9 for column 1-3 respectively, as in Estevez-
Abe et. al (2001). Each indicator has been standardized to vary between 0 and. However, values for the USA
and Germany differ from those in Estevez-Abe et. al (2001), because there the highest value within the sample
has the value 1. To be able to compare the indexes with Riboud et al. (2002), here EPL for Germany and the UK
is standardized using the whole scale, which takes values between 0 and 6. This does not change the ranking of
values in column 4.
c) values in brackets refer to the pre-2003 Labour Code.
Sources: Estevez-Abe et. al (2001: Table 4.1), OECD (1999).  Riboud et al. (2002), own calculations.
The similarity between Slovenia and Germany is striking. The higher overall value of 0.67
almost exclusively can be put down to a higher collective dismissals protection in Slovenia.
With respect to EPL-values Slovenia can be grouped together with Germany, Austria or the
Netherlands (OECD 1999). In Estonia EPL-Index is still higher than in Germany, the
archetypal CME. By 2005, a new Labour Code is being discussed in Parliament most
probably leading to a lower value of EPL (Philips and Eamets 2003b,  2004 ).
A comparison of the EPL-index (ﬁrst column of Table 3.3) for groups of CMEs, LMEs, and
transition economies, results in the following picture.
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LMEs and CEE economies (Riboud et al. 2002)
Figure 3.3 reveals that overall employment protection in transition economies is higher than
in both typical LMEs and CMEs. One can still ﬁnd legacies from the communist past in this
area. The Slovenian ﬁgure, which captures the EPL after reforms, ﬁts very well among the
ﬁrst group of CMEs. However, the Estonian index sits uneasily among the second cluster of
LMEs. As stated above, a new legislation will most probably bring this value in line with
typical LME-values.
Unemployment protection
To measure different degrees of UP, Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 167-169) make use of net
replacement rates, i.e. unemployment beneﬁts as the percentage of previous income net of
taxes. Furthermore, the share of GDP paid in unemployment beneﬁts as a percentage of the
share of unemployed in the total population is considered. As a third measure they construct
an index, which expresses the discretion an unemployed person has in rejecting a job offer
without losing eligibility for beneﬁts. As in the case of EP from these three indicators an
overall index of UP is calculated. For lack of exactly corresponding data, we content
ourselves with indicators, from which analogous conclusions can be drawn. These are gross
replacement rates, the share of GDP paid in unemployment beneﬁts as a percentage of the
share of unemployed in total labour force, and thirdly the maximum duration of
unemployment beneﬁts. These ﬁgures are presented in Table 3.4.














UK 36 0.17 12
Estonia 40
c 0.02 12
Germany 61 0.39 32
Slovenia 63 0.22 24
a Unemployment beneﬁts as percentage of previous income.
b share of unemployed in total labour force.
c estimation for 2003 by Vodopivec et al. (2003); 50 % in the ﬁrst 100 days of unemployment period.
Sources: Riboud et al. (2002), Vodopivec et al. (2003)
The Slovenian replacement rate constitutes, with the exception of Hungary, the highest of the
studied transitional economies (Riboud et al. 2002). It is well in line with the German rate. In
addition, its expenditures are the highest, although lower than in Germany. This is most
probably also conditioned by strained budgets in most transition countries. In Estonia a new
legislation went into force in 2003. Before that replacement rate was 10 per cent of average
income. Vodopivec et al. (2003) estimate a rate of 40 per cent of previous income (50 per
cent in the ﬁrst 100 days) for the new law. Still, it seems that it is too early to clearly evaluate
the new legislation, because discussions about further reform go on (Leetmaa 2003). That
means that the value for unemployment beneﬁts (2 per cent) might be too small an estimate,
too.
Still, all this goes to show that both countries coming from similar points of departure went
into opposite directions. Slovenia built up a CME-like system with a generous replacement
rate, relatively high overall expenditures, and long maximum duration of payments.
Alternatively, Estonia stuck to a policy of very low replacement rates and expenditures
similar to LMEs throughout the 1990s, only to raise them a little above the value for the UK.
Duration of beneﬁts is the same as in the UK.
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The area of vocational training is a key element for VoC, because here appropriate skills are
formed for distinct innovation strategies. In socialism vocational training was roughly the
same in all CEE countries: large state-controlled ﬁrms cooperated with state-run technical
schools. This led – very similarly to Germany – to ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skill
formation. Along with the collapse of many ﬁrms with the shock of system change schools
lost the opportunity to train students appropriately (Roberts 2001: 317-320). Thus, a new
way of vocational training eventually had to be found.
In Estonia the inherited Soviet-style training scheme was retained until 1998. In June the Law
on Vocational Education Institutions (Kutseoppeastuse seadus) was enacted as the outcome
of several amendments of previous legislations. Then curricula of high-school (secondary
general) and vocational schools were brought closer to each other by splitting vocational
education up into a secondary and a higher education branch. Also, the division into training
connected to the different sectors was broken up. The explicit goal was to prepare apprentices
to more general tasks, which could be applied more broadly. This meant a fundamental
change of the system of education and vocational training, and at the same time a shift
towards an emphasis on general skills (OECD 2001, chapter 4).
In contrast, in Slovenia, the struggling old system was put on a new basis by introducing a
dual system of apprenticeships, very much like the German system. Apprentices are trained
both at ﬁrms and in vocational schools, thereby acquiring both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-
speciﬁc skills. The latter is ensured by a common standardization and mutual recognition of
degrees. A similar system had existed previously in Slovenia, but had been abolished in the
beginning of the 1980s. The reintroduced dual system functions along a school-only training,
but is expected to become the dominant form of vocational education (Gerzina et al. 2000:
51).
3.3 Emerging comparative institutional advantages
Beyond a classiﬁcation of countries into respective baskets of LME or CME, VoC goes
further to argue that the institutional conﬁgurations based on institutional complementarities
can serve to explain economic structures. Although in their basic introduction into the
concept (Hall and Soskice 2001) the authors merely tentatively touch on that topic, the
underlying thought is far-reaching for internal economic structures, foreign direct investment
and trade: the sectoral distributions should be highest in those economic activities in which
countries have a comparative institutional advantage. Hence, one should be able to observe
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recently, due to ongoing liberalization of capital ﬂows institutional conﬁgurations may lead to
an “institutional arbitrage” in the sense that companies shift production to those countries
which serve their institutional needs better, particularly regarding modes of innovation: “…
companies may locate […] activities in coordinated market economies in order to secure
access to the quality control, skill levels, and capacities for incremental innovation that their
institutional frameworks offer.” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 57). The reverse is true for activities
which rely on radical innovations: here ﬁrms use greater openness on a global scale to move
activities to liberal market economies. A clear-cut empirical investigation into the issue of
comparative institutional advantages is still to come (cf. Taylor 2004).
In the present case of Estonia and Slovenia a ﬁrst examination of trade patterns and foreign
direct investment according to the identiﬁed economic systems will shed light on
comparative institutional advantages.
2.1 Sectoral contributions to the trade balance
The contribution of speciﬁc sectors to the trade of nations is a ﬁrst measure to identify
possible comparative advantages. Freudenberg and Lemoine (1999) use trade data for
Central and Eastern Europe for the period from 1993 to 1996. They apply an index developed
by Lafay (1992) for the sectoral contribution to the trade balance. The index takes a negative
value for comparative disadvantage and a positive for an advantage in a speciﬁc sector
10.
Their overall assessment of the specialization of transition economies in their trade with the
EU reveals that comparative advantages can be predominantly found in resource- and/or
labour-intensive industries as wood or textiles. This is mostly due to huge wage differentials
to western economies. However, at the same time the authors identify a beginning trend of
‘despecialization’ in these very sectors. A detailed analysis of Estonia and Slovenia in this
period reveals the following patterns: Estonia shows comparative advantages in areas such as
wood, coke and textiles. Furthermore, comparative disadvantages in manufacturing sectors
such as optics, motor vehicles or machinery and equipment increased in the period from
1993-1996. Slovenia also shows comparative advantages in similar sectors, such as wearing
10. The Lafay-indicator is deﬁned as: , whereby subscript I
denotes speciﬁc industries under study and T refers to total trade volumes, for exports X and imports M. Y stands
for the country’s GDP. The ﬁrst term of the indicator measures the trade balance for a single industry weighted
with GDP. The second term attempts to eliminate variations caused by business cycles. It expresses a theoretical
trade balance for the case that all industries contribute according to their share in total trade. Thus, a positive L
for a given industry indicates that this industry contributes comparatively more than the ‘expected’ share. This is
also the case for a trade deﬁcit, which is smaller than the expected. For LI >0a given industry therefore exhibits
a comparative advantage, and for LI < 0 an industry reveals a comparative disadvantage (Lafay 1992).
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trade balance in electrical machinery. In more advanced manufacturing sectors such as motor
vehicles and chemicals the comparative disadvantage in the beginning of the period
signiﬁcantly decreased, especially in the motor vehicles sector. Also, a shift towards
specialization, i.e. a move from a negative value of the index in 1993 to a positive one in
1996 occurred in the ﬁeld of machineries.
To get further insights into the development of comparative advantages in both countries over
the course of transition the Lafay-Index has been calculated for a subsequent period, from
2000-2003 using SITC Rev. 3 data from the UN COMTRADE database
11. It can be assumed
that this reveals a clearer picture of comparative advantages in both countries as the catch-up
process has carried on. To obtain a ﬁrst impression in Figure 4 a selection of those sectors
will be shown where both countries reveal a contrasting picture of one country showing a
comparative advantage in those manufacturing sectors where the other enjoys a comparative
disadvantage, and vice versa. What interests us most are manufacturing sectors to asses the
shift from labour- and resource-intensive to more advanced industries.
Figure 3.4: Contributions to the trade balance (Lafay-Index) in Estonia and Slovenia. Average 2000-2003,
Source: UN COMTRADE Database, on SITC Rev. 3, two-digit levels.
11.  Freudenberg and Lemoine (1999) use data according to the NACE classiﬁcation system.
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classiﬁcation has potential drawbacks. As this kind of trade data does not account for services
potential comparative institutional advantages of LMEs will not be unearthed through them.
In fact, the analysis seems to be suited best to analyze CMEs, which reveal comparative
institutional advantage in manufacturing sectors captured by international trade data.
However, some conclusion still can be drawn from the analysis of Lafay-Indexes of Estonia
and Slovenia. First of all, from Figure 3.4 it follows that Slovenian trade ﬁgures reveal a
comparative advantage in typical CME-sectors, such as road vehicles, electric machinery and
rubber manufacturing. In these very sectors Estonia has a comparative disadvantage. Second,
the trend predicted by Freudenberg and Lemoine (1999) in Slovenia can be conﬁrmed. The
top category of chemicals (SITC Nr. 5) reveals a positive index in 2003. The case of motor
vehicles is most revealing in this respect. Until 1996 this ﬁgure was negative, since 2000 at
least it shows positive ﬁgures. This points to a deep structural change in the economy. The
third observation refers to the Estonian case: the telecommunications sector reveals a strong
comparative advantage in Estonia.
Not only contributions to the trade balance can point to comparative institutional advantage
of countries, but also movements of foreign direct investments. As argued above, ﬁrms
should locate their activities, or parts of them, in those institutional settings, which ﬁt them
best. At the same time, activities in trade and foreign direct investments are interrelated as
large sectoral inﬂows of foreign direct investment impact on trade performances.
Consequently, in a next step patterns of FDI in Estonia and Slovenia will be analyzed.
2.2 Patterns of foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment ﬂows in Central and Eastern Europe are quite concentrated. The
bulk of investments went to Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states while the CIS
and South-Eastern Europe received a much smaller part. Regarding determinants of foreign
direct investment Kinoshita and Campos (2003) ﬁnd in a study of 25 transition countries that
when controlling for ‘traditional’ determinants of foreign direct investment such as labour
costs, quality of labour, natural resources, infrastructure, proximity to the home country and
macroeconomic factors the most important drivers for FDI are agglomeration effects and
institutions. Institutions are measured as the quality of bureaucracy and the rule of law. From
a VoC-perspective one can argue now that apart from the quality of institutions also the type
of institutions comprising a capitalist system should be important for FDI. 
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Sources: Bank of Estonia and Bank of Slovenia.
2002 2003 2004
Sector (ISIC Rev.1 Class.): Estonia Slovenia Estonia Slovenia Estonia Slovenia
 Manufacturing (D) 18.8 44.1 16.9 47.7 16.7 45.6
 Wholesale and retail trade (G) 13.5 16.3 14.8 14.1 10.0 13.6
Transport, storage & communication (I) 21.4 4.2 16.4 4.7 5.3 4.5
 Financial intermediation (J) 28.0 18.9 26.2 16.1 31.5 19.0
Real Estate, renting and business act. (K) 9.5 14.3 10.3 11.4 22.7 11.7
Different institutional settings with different comparative institutional advantages should
attract different kinds of industries. A rigorous quantitative analysis of this claim goes
beyond the scope of this paper, however, a look at patterns of foreign direct investment for
the country studies of Estonia and Slovenia gives ﬁrst insights into the validity of this
proposition.
Sectoral breakdowns of FDI in Estonia and Slovenia suffer from difﬁculties with
comparability of data. The Bank of Estonia does not provide more detailed data under the top
class in ISIC Rev. 1 classiﬁcation due to conﬁdentiality issues. Slovenian ﬁgures are more
detailed, but not all sections are provided, because of the same reason. This leaves us with a
rather rough picture of foreign direct investment stock in both countries in Table 3.5.
The ﬁgures in Table 5 elucidate the importance of FDI for different sectors of both
economies. It can be seen that the manufacturing sector is the largest absorber of FDI in
Slovenia. Within the sector the division of pharmaceuticals is the largest, corresponding to
trade ﬁgures above. On the other hand, manufacturing plays a subordinate role for Estonia.
There, ﬁnancial intermediation investments have a dominant position followed by a growing
stock of activities connected with real estate, renting and other business activities.
Unsatisfactory data notwithstanding, a few conclusions can be drawn from these ﬁgures:
ﬁrstly, manufacturing investors prefer Slovenia over Estonia, in fact, when comparing
manufacturing stocks for all eight new EU members in 2000, Slovenia scores highest values
of the share of manufacturing in total stocks together with the Czech Republic (UNCTAD
WID, various country studies). Secondly, investment in Estonia predominantly goes into
sectors with a stronger service character, ﬁnancial intermediation and real estate.
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Source: UNCTAD World Investment Directory.
2002 2003 2004
 in Estonia from:
 Sweden 41.0 41.4 45.4
 Finland 27.3 26.7 23.8
 USA 7.1 5.7 5.1
 Netherlands 3.9 3.3 2.6
 Norway 3.2 2.4 2.8
 
in Slovenia from:
Austria 30.2 25.7 29.2
Germany 11.1 7.6 7.2
France 9.8 7.4 7.8
Italy 7.5 6.4 6.3
Croatia 2.1 6.0 5.3
Geographical origin serves as another indicator of emerging structures. From a VoC-
perspective we would expect ﬁrms to shift activities where institutional settings and the
prevailing variety of capitalism suits best. However, a few qualiﬁcations have to be taken into
consideration. In the case of transition economies one must be careful, because large wage
differentials were and still are drivers for investments in the region. In this case, ﬁrms also
shift activities, which match institutional settings of both home and host country due to cost
advantages. Also the distance of the country of origin plays a major role. Table 3.6 lists the
most important countries of origin for Estonia and Slovenia measured as the stock originating
from a country as a share in total foreign direct investment stocks.
Both cases show the strong inﬂuence of geographical proximity of home countries of FDI.
For Estonia these are Sweden and Finland, for Slovenia Austria and to a certain extent Italy
and Croatia. In the Estonian case large ﬁgures of FDI from the Nordic countries as origins of
EAST EUROPEAN ANTIPODES: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM IN ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA 62large companies as Ericsson or Nokia on the one hand and trade in the telecommunications
sector on the other attract attention. Högselius (2005) reports that telecommunications
already before independence traditionally played a prominent role in Estonia. While in the
beginning of the 1990s companies investing in this sector primarily regarded the country as a
low-cost production site, now also innovative and service-related telecommunications
industries are starting to grow in importance.
On the whole, European CME-countries are the dominant investors in both countries.
However, the role of the USA is particularly telling, because here considerations of
geographical distance are the same throughout Eastern Europe. When comparing FDI stocks
from the US as a share of GDP in 2002 for all eight new EU members, Estonia reveals the
highest share of all (UNCTAD WID). The fact that Estonia is most important for American
investors can be explained by its variety of capitalist system, because ﬁrms seeking cost
advantages ﬁnd similar institutions like in their home country. 
3.4 Conclusion
The preceding discussion has shown that Estonia and Slovenia can be seen as polar opposites
regarding their capitalist systems. At the same time, both countries show a high degree of
complementary institutions. The Slovenian case very much resembles coordinated market
economies like Germany or Austria: it reveals corporatist-like labour relations with a large
degree of wage-bargaining coverage and co-determination. Complementarily to this
unemployment and employment protection are high. The vocational training system is
capable of providing ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skills. Quite on the contrary, in
Estonia industrial relations are characterized by a dominance of ﬁrm-level relations and a
little organized workforce. Employment protection is high, but there is evidence that this is a
legacy from Soviet times and is likely to be reduced. The vocational training system has been
reshaped towards general education of the workforce.
However, in the area of corporate governance deviations from the VoC-framework occur in
both countries. On the one hand, the Estonian system cannot be described as a shareholder
model as one would expect for an LME. Enterprise legislation is organized as in a
stakeholder model, but it is circumvented in practice. More importantly, the comparably
small stock-market cannot provide the same function as in an advanced LME. The possibility
of a functional equivalent, which could provide similar disciplining measures as a stock-
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On the other hand, in Slovenia the inﬂuence of investment funds, partly state-owned, and
employee-ownership of companies have been identiﬁed as deviant from representative
CMEs. It has been argued that this could be a functional equivalent in the absence of
proﬁcient banks providing patient capital. Then, the fact that workers partly own their
company can be seen as a transitional institutional complementarity. Thereby incentives to
invest in a high degree of asset speciﬁcity can be established. One has to be cautious with this
claim, because the efﬁciency criterion connected to the notion of institutional
complementarities requires a thorough proof in order to be distinguished from mere
clustering of institutions. As employee-ownership is common to other transition economies
as well a comparative study could illuminate this claim further in future research.
All in all, while the present analysis did answer the question, what kind of capitalism is
emerging in the two countries under study, many more questions have been raised. For
instance, the divergent experience in the reformation of vocational training systems in both
countries is remarkable. Coming from more or less the same starting points both countries
moved into opposite directions. While Estonia accentuated a more general education
perspective in its vocational training system, Slovenia aimed at ﬁrmly institutionalizing a
scheme which is able to provide companies with apprentices endowed with a mix of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc skills. This discrepancy makes a suitable case for studying the
much debated issue of possible inﬂuences of institutional complementarities on the
emergence of institutions (Crouch et al. 2005). Also, when studying emerging comparative
institutional advantages of Eastern European countries it seems desirable to go beyond the
illustrative data employed here and conduct a thorough analysis of a wider country sample.
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Article 3
4.1 Introduction
What determines the emergence of institutions? This central economic question has gained
considerable attention in recent years. The reasons for this interest are manifold. The works
of Douglass North and others have drawn attention to the importance of laws and rules as
incentive devices. Empirical studies show the potentially huge role of those institutions in
explaining growth, development and the lack thereof. The collapse of socialism and larger
integration of the world economy in recent decades have furthermore highlighted the
divergent organization of market economic systems also in the rich Western World.
There are broadly three approaches to explain institutional emergence: ﬁrst, a legal approach,
which sees the main driver of institutions in the legal system of a country. It originated in the
law and ﬁnance literature, in an attempt to explain divergent capacities of countries to
investor protection and protection of creditor rights. The basic tenet that legal origins impact
on the choice of institutions then spreads to other institutional areas, such as labour
legislation and others. A recent overview is given by La Porta et al. (2008).
Second, a political economy perspective sees the speciﬁc type of institutions as a result of
political processes and political economy-considerations. One line of literature starts from the
observation that formal institutions are the product of the political preferences of societies
and as such should be explained by those. For instance, left-wing political views translate
into institutions that generate higher job-security as opposed to right-wing preferences, which
tend to favor labor market ﬂexibility. Secondly, it can be shown theoretically and empirically
that different political institutions such as the voting system give rise to different political
coalitions, which in turn lead to different institutions.
Third, and most recently, cultural explanations have been brought forward to explain
institutional divergence. Proponents of this view put forward the claim that differences in
cultural attitudes of nations are at the root of institutional differences observed today.
Equally important as the question of determinants of institutions is the question, which
institutions to choose as outcomes. Econometrically speaking, while theories of the
determinants of institutions provide the independent or right-hand side variables of the
analysis, the question remains, which institutions to choose as dependent or left-hand side
variables. In this paper, three institutional outcomes will be considered. First, the extent of
65investor protection and labor market institutions are two institutional outcomes frequently
chosen (Botero et al. 2004, Pagano and Volpin 2005) as pivotal economic institutions, which
differ considerably across countries. Hence, in order to build on existing theoretical and
empirical studies, in this paper measures of both will be used. A third institutional measure
stems from a systemic approach to comparative institutional analysis. Comparative
institutional analysis in the spirit of Aoki (2001) and Greif (2006) develops game-theoretic
models, in which two or more institutional equilibria can exist. In addition to this, building on
Williamsonian transaction costs economics, Hall and Soskice (2001) develop ideal types of
liberal and coordinated market economies, which as systems can explain ongoing divergence
of institutions across countries. Working with the notion of institutional systems warrants the
employment of some sort of systemic variables. This is provided for Eastern European
transition economies by Knell and Srholec (2007).
This paper attempts to further our understanding about the relative importance of these
different approaches of determining institutions by analyzing the experience of Eastern
European former communist countries. Twenty years after the beginning of the transition
from plan to market, most countries have established both a market economic system and
democracy. While the starting conditions as post-socialist countries were very similar for
most countries, the outcomes show a considerable diversity of institutional outcomes. There
will be two empirical strategies to gauge the relative importance of said political, legal and
cultural theories. First, a sample of both transition and non-transition countries will be
subjected to a number of cross-country regression of long-term average values. In order to
allow transition countries to stand out, a host of interaction terms will be included. Second, a
dynamic panel model including transition countries alone is estimated to shed further light on
the relative importance of different approaches and to tackle endogeneity issues. On the
whole, the analysis in this paper suggests that the type of institutions, which emerged in
Central and Eastern European countries can be partly explained by political economy
arguments. Speciﬁcally, an adjusted proportionality measure of the voting system, which
takes into account the unusually high disproportionality of election outcomes in Eastern
Europe can explain the choice of investor protection in a dynamic panel estimation. Legal
origin and cultural dimensions play a smaller role in the panel regressions, but have some
explanatory power when it comes to cross-country pooled samples including non-transition
countries.
The contribution of the paper can be seen as twofold: on the one hand it attempts to further
our understanding about processes taking place during the emergence of newly democratized
countries. On the other hand, the unique experience in Central and Eastern Europe allows to
subject competing theories, which by and large have been developed against the backdrop of
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establish which of the approaches is best suited to explain what actually happened in the
“laboratory” of transition countries offers the opportunity to make inferences about their
relative importance.
The analysis proceeds as follows: in section 2 the literature on the determinants of
institutional conﬁgurations is brieﬂy introduced. Hence, this section discusses relevant
theoretical contributions, which determine the right-hand side variables. Section 3 then
discusses in more detail the use of institutional measures as left-hand side variables. Special
emphasis will be put on the discussion of systemic approaches to institutional divergence.
Section 4 discusses the transition process and resulting post-communist peculiarities that
have to be addressed. Section 5 introduces the data, methodologies and results of the
estimations. Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 The determinants of institutions
Broadly, three approaches can be distinguished, which see the main determinant of
institutions in legal, political or cultural origins. They will be discussed in turn.
4.2.1  Legal origin
This approach has been expanded since the initial publication by La Porta et al. (1998) and
has been recently summarized and synthesized in La Porta et al. (2008). Put in a nutshell, this
literature posits that the type of economic institutions depends on the legal tradition of a
country. Publications within this line of work are ﬁrst and foremost a huge empirical task as a
large number of indicators for an unprecedented large sample of countries is collected.
Djankov et al. (2003) lay out the underlying framework, which serves as the (sometimes
implicit) reference for most of the contributions. Empirical contributions then investigate
shareholder and creditor protection (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2007; Djankov et al.
2008), corporate governance, with respect to ownership (La Porta et al. 1999) and capital
markets (La Porta et al. 1997), labour market and social security legislation (Botero et al.
2004), the efﬁciency of judicial procedures (Djankov et al. 2003), the size and scope of
government intervention as a whole (La Porta et al. 1999), the burden of regulation of setting
up a business (Djankov et al. 2002) and government’s ownership of banks (La Porta et al.
2002), and the independence of the judiciary (La Porta et al. 2004).
In all of these studies countries are classiﬁed as having either a Common Law system, a
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Some contributions also introduce countries from Central and Eastern Europe, their legal
systems sometimes coded according to the pre-socialist legal heritage (Pistor 2000) or
sometimes simply as ‘socialist’ (Botero et al. 2004). The unequivocal result is that in all areas
under study, Common Law countries score best, followed by Scandinavian and German civil
law countries, leaving the worst results to counries relying on the French Code Civil.
A more nuanced version of this is presented by Berkowitz et al. (2003), who point out the
large importance of the way a legal system was established in a country. Those countries,
which adapted a system out of a deliberate decision and/or were already well acquainted with
its functioning beforehand, fare better than countries, to which the legal traditions were
transplanted externally. The latter approach can be observed speciﬁcally with French
colonizers (Merryman 1996).
In a vast number of publications, it can be empirically shown that investor protection is
signiﬁcantly better in countries of the English Common-Law origin than in French Civil-Law
countries (Djankov et al. 2008). Also, looking at labour market institutions, it can be shown
that countries with a French legal tradition have higher labour market rigidities than Common
Law countries (Botero et al. 2004). As a result of these institutional differences both ﬁnancial
development and income measures show better results in Common Law countries than in
Civil Law ones.
The difference in corporate governance institutions is explained to work through two
channels, a political mechanism and an adaptability mechanism (Beck et al. 2003; Beck and
Levine 2005). The political mechanism puts forward the claim that in Common Law
countries the law traditionally works as a strong counterbalance against expropriation by the
state and as such ensures better protection of private contracting rights. The judiciary tends to
be more independent. This, in turn, facilitates better ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial
development. On the contrary, in Civil Law countries the law tends to side with the state
rather than individuals. The adaptability mechanism argues that legal traditions differ in their
formalism and therefore their ability to evolve with technological changes. It is argued that
due to less legal formalism coupled with the widespread use of case law Common Law can
adapt better and more efﬁciently to changing conditions than Civil Law (Priest 1977; Rubin
1977; Rubin 2005). Hence, to summarize, the political channel explains cross-country
differences in ﬁnancial development with cross-country differences in the independence of
the judiciary (and hence private property rights), while the adaptability channel explains
cross-country differences in ﬁnancial development with cross-country differences in the
ﬂexibility of the law.
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literature in earlier publications includes some Central European countries coded as
“socialist” law. In later studies, those countries become recoded as either their pre-war legal
system or as the predominant code introduced in the 1990s. All in all, including those
countries never changes the basic empirical message. Stated differently, Central and Eastern
European countries as Civil Law countries ﬁt neatly into the mold of the Common Law -
Civil Law divide. Pistor et al. (2000) expand La Porta et al.’s (1998) Antidirector index to
Eastern European countries ﬁnding that on average investor protection is better in those
countries than in previously studied sample of advanced capitalist countries. Looking at the
Eastern European sample, it should be noted that the countries under study belong to either a
German or French legal origin, or cannot be classiﬁed at all. This means that the usual
Common Law-Civil Law divide does not apply in this case. However, legal origin theory so
far has consistently shown that within the group of Civil Law countries, there is a discernible
difference between German and French origin. Speciﬁcally, in all empirical studies countries
with German tradition come out better than French counterparts with respect to corporate
governance institutions (Djankov et al. 2008) and show less labor market rigidity (Botero et
al. 2004).
4.2.2  Political Economy
Political economy models the emergence of institutions as the result of political and
constitutional institutions and policies. There are two broad approaches to be distinguished. A
number of studies models the effect of political institutions such as the voting system on
coalition building. As a result, different coalitions can push forward different policies
(Pagano and Volpin 2005, Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). A second approach leaves out the
modeling of intermediate stages between preferences and outcomes arguing a direct
relationship between preferences and outcomes of policies, sometimes incorporating a
historical component (Roe 2006). This second approach also incorporates outcomes of
political power of groups, which can levy power over political decisions (Perotti and von
Thadden 2006).
Characteristics of the political system are used to explain variants of market economy
systems. Political economists both coming from an economics background and a political
science background focus on voting systems to explain the emergence of economic
institutions. Most prominently, economists Pagano and Volpin (2005) propose a model with
managers, shareholders and workers. Managers prefer low investor protection, because that
makes it possible for them to extract private beneﬁts from the ﬁrm. To obtain the political
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themselves with regards to ﬁring. Whether this agreement (which is a stylized description of
a corporatist or coordinated market economy) can prevail, depends on the distribution of
equity ownership and on the political process. Speciﬁcally, workers must have little or no
equity stakes and/or the political system must support coalition governments (i.e. voting rules
should be of proportional representation). Then, what can be observed is that low investor
protection goes hand in hand with high job security. On the other hand, if workers themselves
have considerable equity stakes and/or the political system is not in favor of coalition
building (majoritarian systems), the model predicts high shareholder protection and low
employee protection. In fact, looking at the proportionality of voting systems in OECD
countries Pagano and Volpin (2005) conﬁrm this correlation. While countries with
majoritarian voting systems such as the United States and the United Kingdom have
relatively higher investor protectiona and low labor market rigidity, most countries with some
variant of a proportional system present the opposite picture. Hence, the crucial point of the
voting system is the extent of coalition-building it allows. In general, proportional systems
are associated with a larger number of veto-players, and hence, produce policies for a broader
constituency. Majoritarian systems, on the other hand, as a rule have less veto points, and
therefore policies can rapidly swing (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, chapter 4).
The second group of political-economy views of institutional development models the
relation between preferences and outcomes more directly. The formation of preferences can
have different causes. For example, a high-skilled but ﬁnancially constrained worker will
prefer high job security and low investor protection, which is broadly the description of a
Western European country that saw great ﬁnancial destruction by hyper-inﬂation and wars
(Perotti and von Thadden 2006). On the other hand, incumbent industrial interest groups with
considerable market power oppose better investor protection. For them, monopoly rents are
in danger if a better investor protection and ensuing ﬁnancial development possibly breeds
local competition driving down monopoly rents (Rajan and Zingales 2003). A similar
argument is made by Roe (2003, 2006), where additionally the dispersion of ownership
played a role. There it is argued that a more concentrated ownership helped European capital
keep in check rising demand by labor for rent-sharing. Hence, in such a setting, capital did
not have an interest in furthering investor protection and risking a higher dispersion of
ownership. As a result of partly political-economy arguments and historical circumstance,
different preferences emerge and ﬁnd their manifestation in both partisan politics in an
ideological left-right spectrum and ensuing emerging institutions.
While most transition countries introduced an electoral system of proportional representation,
political scientists studying the area point at unusual outcomes in terms of the
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share of votes a party receives and the share of parliamentary seats it receives. This tends to
be larger for majoritarian systems, because in a ﬁrst-past-the-post system the winner takes the
seat practically discarding all votes not cast for the winning candidate. Roberts (2006) ﬁnds
that unlike in older democracies in the West, Central and Eastern European countries, which
have a proportional system still exhibit high disproportionality between votes and seats. The
main explanation is that in nascent democracies of Eastern Europe typically for general
elections a large number of small new parties runs for an election. Each gets too small a
number of seats to jump the threshold of representation, but in total they receive a
considerable number of seats. This, in turn, means that a de jure proportional system in such
a case can have the de facto result of a majoritarian system. Stated differently, the degree of
proportionality is reduced.
While the literature on political determinants is fairly novel, the theoretical predictions are
nevertheless clearly to be formulated into predictions about newly emerging capitalist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Controlling for possible disproportionality, a larger
share of seats allotted according to proportional voting, the better investor protection and
higher labor market rigidity is expected. In addition, political platforms corresponding to
different ideologies can have an inﬂuence on institutional change: left-wing parties are
expected to further labor market institutions making it harder to ﬁre workers, possibly at the
expense of greater investor protection. Right-wing platforms, on the other hand, are expected
to be correlated with the opposite: better investor protection and less labor market rigidity.
4.2.3  Culture
A growing literature models the variety of institutions as the result of deeply rooted cultural
differences between countries. In general, there are two ways to model the effect of culture
on any economic outcome. Either in ﬁrst step the effect of cultural attitudes on preferences
and institutions is established, which in a second step can be shown to have an inﬂuence on
some outcome. Or, as a short-cut, the direct effect of culture on outcomes is examined. For
the present study, the second step is of less importance, because the focus is solely on
establishing the type of institutions that emerge. The literature offers a broad range of
economic outcomes under study. For instance, the level of trust between European countries
as a result of cultural similarities is shown to have an impact on the magnitude of trade across
countries (Guiso et al. 2009). Also, trustworthiness within an economy appears to foster
entrepreneurship (Guiso et al. 2006). Several studies use religion to map cultural differences
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increases income in a country; church membership alone does not have any positive effect, a
result which is qualiﬁed recently by Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010), who ﬁnd that in high-
income countries mere membership has a positive impact on income, while in low-income
countries it does not.
More in line with this paper and being more speciﬁc about the term culture, Licht et al.
(2005, 2007) incorporate indicators of cultural attitudes developed by Schwartz (1994) to
explain divergent outcomes in corporate governance institutions and governance institutions
of countries. The Schwartz data measure attitudes along three axes with two dimensions each.
They are the outcomes of detailed surveys. The dimensions along the three axes refer to
Embeddedness versus Autonomy, Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism and Mastery versus
Harmony. For a detailed description of the content of each variable see Licht et al. (2005),
Table 1A. They are able to show that cultural dimensions explain to a certain degree the
extent of investor protection measured as La Porta et al’s (1998) Antidirector index and
creditor rights and more general governance variables such as the rule of law, anti-corruption
institutions and accountability. Relatedly, but using religion as a proxy for culture, Stulz and
Williamson (2003) look at the distinction between predominantly catholic and protestant
countries to ﬁnd that the former protect investor rights to a lesser extent the latter.
Close to the investigation in this paper, Schwartz (2007) tests his six cultural dimensions
according to their correlation with a measure of institutional coordination by Hall and
Gingerich (2004). The latter provides country values for corporate governance and labor
market institutions. Schwartz ﬁnds that his cultural attitude values of Harmony,
Egalitarianism and Autonomy have a signiﬁcant positive correlation with a larger degree of
coordination, i.e. non-market institutions. On the other hand, Mastery, Hierarchy and
Embeddedness are correlated with lesser degrees of coordination, which means that they tend
to be found in countries with more market-based corporate governance and higher labor
market ﬂexibility.
In a similar vein, but taking a systemic view of institutions, Pryor (2007) ﬁnds ﬁve country
clusters on the basis of answers to a host of questions from the World Value Survey. In
addition, the ﬁve country clusters align with ﬁve country clusters of institutional systems
(Pryor 2005). Hence, Pryor can show that ﬁve distinct variants of market economic systems
found in Anglo-Saxon, North European, West European and South European countries with
Japan as the single member of a ﬁfth group exhibit also distinct values systems. Examining
each of the six dimensions developed by Schwartz (1994) and used by Licht et al. (2005,
2007), Pryor (2008) establishes that only two of the three pairs have partially signiﬁcant
explanatory power. Harmony and Hierarchy are related to the form of capitalist system with
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correlated with Anglo-Saxon variants of economic organization, while Harmony has a
negative sign. Egalitarianism shows a positive correlation with less market-oriented systems
in parts of the estimations.
4.3 Institutional diversity
Having discussed existing theories of institutional emergence, in a next step the outcome
variable will be discussed. Stated differently, while the preceding chapter introduced the
independent, or right-hand side variables, in this chapter the dependent, or left-hand side
variables are covered.
Investor protection and labor market institutions are the most commonly applied outcome
variables. Hence, for approaches discussed above, there exist already both theoretical and
empirical results for non-transition countries, to which the results in the present study can be
compared.
In addition to that I will test the impact of political, legal and cultural indicators on a more
encompassing systemic institutional variable from Knell and Srholec (2007). This indicator
captures institutional divergence along the dimensions of labour market regulations, business
regulation and social security systems. It is based on the notion of institutional
complementarities developed by Aoki (1994, 2001), which is utilized by the varieties-of-
capitalism school (Hall and Soskice 2001) in order to compare different types of capitalist
systems. Hence, the coordination index can be seen as a more encompassing indicator
capturing the degree of corporatism in a country than individual indicators of speciﬁc
domains such as labor market institutions.
Figure 4.1 shows scores for both non-transition countries in the upper part of the graph and
transition countries in the lower part. Positive values of the indicator point to a higher degree
of coordination in the economy, which means that there is more redistribution in the economy
and less ﬂexible labor markets. Negative values show that a country allows for more market
relations, which means that there is less redistribution through the social security system and
more ﬂexible labor laws. Looking at the sample of countries in the upper part of the graph
shows more or less expected classiﬁcations: Continental European countries such as France,
Austria and Germany and some Scandinavian countries like Finland and Sweden exhibit
more coordination, while Anglo-Saxon countries show less. For some countries, classiﬁcation
is different than in most of the varieties-of-capitalism literature; most notably, Belgium and
Japan are usually classiﬁed also as more coordinated market economies. The lower part of the
diagram introduces Central and Eastern European transition countries. 
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Source: the coordination index used here is the sum of indices on redistribution and labour market institutions 
developed by Knell and Srholec (2007)
What catches the eye there is that by and large, most post-socialist countries are more
market-oriented than coordinated; only seven out of 25 countries score a positive value on the
coordination index. The scores in Figure 4.1 suggest that by including Central and Eastern
European countries the group of more market-oriented countries has been enlarged to include
countries, which do not have an Anglo-Saxon background. Stated differently, these are
countries with a Continental background coming from Civil-law legal traditions, which
nevertheless allow markets as dominant coordination device. Before turning to the analysis of
the emergence of systems, salient features of the transition process, which are suspected to
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4.4 The transition from socialism to capitalism
A priori, a number of known peculiarities of Eastern European countries lead to additional
control variables that should be included. These refer to the impact of privatization, the
relative underdevelopment of the party system, external factors and in general the severity
and length of the socialist period.
Soon after World War II all countries east to West Germany and Austria had introduced some
variant of a socialist economic system. While the “socialist block” was by no means
monolithic in the sense that market experiments were introduced to a certain degree in some
countries in some periods of time, the unifying characteristic of all countries was that by and
large private property of the “means of production” was greatly restricted. As a result, one of
the main challenges for all countries was the privatization of state and collective property. 
Three main privatization strategies can be distinguished, which are expected to have different
impacts on the relative power of workers, managers and investors. Voucher or mass
privatization put the emphasis on speed by giving out small shares in companies. As a result,
ownership in the beginning was dispersed. However, over time in most countries the bulk of
shares was being bought by investment funds and banks, which tended to increase
concentration again. The second privatization method involved management and employee
buy-outs (MEBO) of the ﬁrm. Thirdly, state-owned companies were sold directly to investors
in direct sales (Roland 2000). Different countries used different strategies at different points
in time, whereby in most cases a dominant privatization strategy can be identiﬁed. Table 4.1
gives an overview, which strategy transition countries predominantly chose.
The insider privatization with the management or employee-buyout option entrenches
existing managers and workers with the ﬁrm. In terms of the Pagano-Volpin model discussed
earlier this means that the political power position of managers and workers is greatly
strengthened. Against this backdrop, it can be expected that the predominant use of insider
privatization methods will foster political resistance to better investor protection and
therefore ceteris paribus lead to worse scores on that variable.
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(MEBO)























Note: a strategy is considered dominant if it is used in the largest number of years between 1990 and 2006.
Source: Gouret (2007) and EBRD (2006)
Mass privatization, on the other hand, is expected to enhance investor protection. Depending
on the speciﬁc process, a large amount of the population receives vouchers of company
shares, which can be traded. Although, for the most part the process did not lead to envisaged
dispersed ownership (Buck 2003; Grosfeld and Hashi 2007), by and large, more individuals
become equity owners under this privatization scheme than if other types are utilized. As a
result, popular support for investor protection is expected to be large and should translate into
better institutions. Unfortunately, data on ownership concentration as the intermediate step
between privatization method and preferences towards investor protection is not available for
a most transition countries.
Lastly, for direct sales it can be expected that the question of reverse causality is strongest for
this type of strategy. In other words, a country planning to directly sale state-owned
companies to outside investors, is aware of the fact that investor protection must be high for
an investor to show an interest in the ﬁrst place. Hence, the relation between direct sales of
state-owned companies is expected to be positive without stating a causality.
A number of empirical investigations have shown that the speed of reforms in the initial
transition stage is crucial for both further institutional and structural development, since it
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country waits with basic macroeconomic stabilization, the more sluggish the reform process
proceeds (Havrylyshyn 2006; Aslund 2007). Also, it is widely held that both the prospect of
EU membership has a positive inﬂuence on institutional reform effort. What is more,
although the starting point of reform was similar to a large degree, initial conditions differed
in the degree of macroeconomic distortion across countries, which is found to have an
inﬂuence of reforms later on (de Melo et al. 2001; Di Tommaso et al. 2007).
To summarize, there are three theoretical approaches at explaining the emergence of
particular types of institutions or institutional systems. Political, legal and cultural variables
are seen to inﬂuence the type of economies. Armed with theoretical predictions and having
established special inﬂuencing variables in the case of post-communist countries, in a next
step an empirical analysis will be carried out to evaluate evidence for those predictions.
4.5 The determinants of institutions in Central and Eastern Europe
The empirical analysis involves two strategies. First, a pooled dataset will be used to get a
ﬁrst impression of the relative importance of different factors. In this analysis, transition
countries will be put together with other non-transition countries. In a second step, panel
estimation of transition countries only will deepen the understanding. Data sources are
discussed in the next section.
4.5.1  Dependent variables
Investor protection data come from Djankov et al. (2008) and from the World Bank Doing
Business report World Bank (2009), as are indicators of labor market rigidity based on the
methodology in Botero et al. (2004). For both, the year 2009 is used in the cross-sectional
analysis. As a third variable a coordination index developed by Knell and Srholec (2007) will
be included. As discussed above, while investor protection and labor market regulation
measure institutions in particular spheres of an economy, this indicator attempts to map a
system as a whole. As opposed to similar “corporatism” indicators from empirical political
science and sociology (for an overview see Kenworthy 2003) this indicator includes broader
information. In addition, it is available for all Eastern European countries.
In order to construct a panel dataset additional indicators for investor protection are needed.
For investor protection the annually published transition indicator on securities legislation by
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available for all countries since 1990. Obviously, the indicator is not equivalent to investor
protection data coming from the Doing Business project. The EBRD measures the adherence
of securities legislation to a benchmark developed by the EBRD. A large part of the indicator
involves investor protection, and speciﬁcally minority investors protection. Unfortunately,
employment protection legislation indicators do not exist for a sufﬁciently high number of
countries and years.
Parts (ii) to (v) discuss the independent variables used in the estimation.
4.5.2  Legal variables
Most of CEE countries have a Civil-Law tradition, which dates back to German or French
inﬂuences. The analysis follows Pistor et al.’s (2000) classiﬁcation of countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.
4.5.3  Political variables
In order to test hypotheses put forward by the political-economy view of institutional
emergence, both the proportionality of the voting system and the political ideology of the
executive will be measured. While both are included in the panel estimation in section 6, the
cross-section analysis of section covers proportionality only. Both proportionality data and
information of the ideological stance of the executive come from the World Bank data base
on political institutions (Beck et al. 2001, in the most recent update including data for
2009). Following Pagano and Volpin (2005) the index of the proportionality of a voting
system will be constructed such that it takes the value 3 if all seats are allocated through
proportional voting, zero if none and numbers in between for intermediate values.
Partisanship of the executive is coded as either left, right or center. Both proportionality and
partisan variables enter the analysis as 4-year moving averages to capture the long-term effect
those variables have.
As discussed above, Eastern European politics stand out in that the disproportionality of
election results is exceptionally high (Roberts 2006). Disproportionality here is measured
following the least squares index developed by Gallagher (1991). This index measures how
many seats a party receives in an election compared to the number of votes it received.
Traditionally, it is high in majoritarian systems and low in proportional systems (Lijphart
1984; Lijphart 1999). This distorting effect from unusual high disproportionality is captured
in two ways. In the ﬁrst pooled cross-section analysis the measure of disproportionality of
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this analysis the difference between transition countries and non-transition countries will a
function of the disproportionality. In the ensuing panel analysis an additional adjusted
proportionality index is constructed. The adjustment weighs the proportionality on the books
by the degree of disproportionality between votes and seats of election outcomes. Put simply,
a perfectly proportional system with a comparatively high disproportional election outcome
scores a smaller number than 3 in the adjusted proportionality index in order to measure the
diversion from a proportional system that assigns 100% of seats proportionally. Calculation
of the index follows Gallagher (1991). Most values are taken from Gallagher, for some
countries the indices have been updated using information on most recent election results.
4.5.4  Cultural variables
In order to receive a workable indicator, I submitted four of Schwartz’s cultural value data
used by Licht et al. (2005, 2007) to a factor analysis, which generates weights to transform
the four dimensions into one indicator variable. The factor loadings are shown in Table 4.2.
The factor loadings are then used to construct an indicator by weighting each of the four
indicators. Table A1 in the appendix (page 93) lists the indicator for the available countries.
Generally speaking, smaller values indicate that the cultural attitudes favor relatively more
egalitarianism in society. It can be seen that Central and Eastern European countries show a
wide range of values. While Russia, Bulgaria or Poland seem to exhibit similar cultural
attitudes as Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK or USA, others are more similar to West
European countries such as the Netherlands or Switzerland. Admittedly, merging four of the
six indicators developed by Schwartz (1994) into one index means losing information on ﬁne
differences between different dimensions.
However, since cultural attitudes shall be included alongside other variables on political and
legal indicators, concessions have to be made in order to save degrees of freedom. The four
indicators used here present still some information on general attitudes towards an egalitarian
and harmonious society. Dropping the variables on Embeddedness and Autonomy is further
justiﬁed by Pryor’s (2008) ﬁnding that both are the two variables with the least explanatory
power when it comes to the correlation between cultural and economic systems.
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Factor loading Uniqueness
Hierarchy  0.8578 0.2812
Egalitarianism  -0.6505 0.5768
Mastery 0.6650 0.5578
Harmony -0.7120 0.4930
4.5.5  Control variables
As control variables, I include GDP per capita (World Bank Statistical Ofﬁce), the
predominant privatization methods (Gouret 2007) and various EBRD (2006) and a dummy
for transition countries. In addition to this, interaction terms for transition countries and the
indicators on political, legal and cultural factors will be included. For all estimated models
involving political variables, only those countries are included, which correspond to a
Freedom House index of 5 and lower, hence, which are considered at least partly free
(Freedom House 2009). For the cross section dataset this is found as an average over the
period 1989 to 2004. In the panel analysis the preceeding four years must have been
considered partly free on average.
4.5.6  Cross-country dataset
As a ﬁrst step, a simple cross-country model will be estimated. In this model, for each of the
dependent and independent variables, averages over the entire period between 1989 and 2004
are used. This seems a justiﬁed simpliﬁcation, because all indicators on the right-hand side,
political, legal and cultural variables, are expected to develop over longer periods of time. 
Although the predictive power of such a model is limited due to a relatively small number of
observations it can provide a ﬁrst step towards understanding the workings of institutional
emergence in Eastern Europe. As discussed above, three institutional indicators measuring
investor protection, labour regulation and a general system variable of coordination in the
economy will be used as dependent variables. The baseline estimation equation is then the
following:
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In this equation, refers to the legal tradition of country i, denotes various variables
concerning the political system of a country, and measures culture. The vector x denotes a
set of control variables. The dependent variable measures institutions of the outcomes in a
particular country.
In order to keep the number of observations as high as possible, but still allow for different
intercepts and slopes of coefﬁcients for Central and Eastern European countries, I include
both dummy variables for transition countries and interaction terms between the dummy
variable and the respective institutional variables. This allows to gauge the distinctiveness of
transition countries compared to non-transition countries.
Table 4.3 reports ﬁrst results for the political variable of proportionality of the voting system.
Columns 1 to 3 report results for the impact on investor protection, 4 to 6 shows results for
labor market institutions, and the last 3 columns give estimation coefﬁcients for a
coordination index by Knell and Srholec (2007). The ﬁrst column of each dependent variable
(1, 4 and 7) show results for all non-transition countries. The respective second column (2, 5,
8) include transition countries including a dummy and interaction effect. Last, in columns 3,
6 and 9, the transition dummy is replaced by a measure of the average disproportionality of
election results and a corresponding interaction effect. As discussed above, this reﬂects the
tendency of elections in transition countries to exclude a large chunk of votes even if the
electoral system is proportional.
First of all, the sign of proportionality is always as expected from theory: a more proportional
voting system is associated with less investor protection, higher labor market rigidity and a
higher coordination index.
It is also clear from these results that ceteris paribus more advanced countries in terms of
GDP per capita have better investor protection, less rigid labor markets and exhibit overall
less coordination. Transition countries, on the other hand, display the opposite behavior. The
marginal effect of proportionality when the transition dummy takes the value one, however,
is never signiﬁcant. What is more, in the model of investor protection (column 2) it points in
the opposite direction than theory predicts. This could lead one to conclude that in transition
countries the type of the voting system does not have an inﬂuence on institutional outcomes
as in “western” countries. However, as discussed above it is suspected that in transition
countries during the period of study, this does not measure the “true” proportionality of the
system. Introducing a measure of disproportionality in models 3, 6 and 9, by and large does
not change coefﬁcients on the other independent variables. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)





























































































Observations 41 62 56 41 62 56 23 44 38
R² 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.37
F 4.22 3.73 5.23 9.18 5.05 5.99 6.50 4.23 4.76
OLS results. Robust tandard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Plotting the marginal effect of the proportionality against different values of the
disproportionality of the voting system shows that for small values of disproportionality, the
sign of the marginal effect corresponds to what theory predicts (see Figure A1 in the
appendix, page 95). Only as the disproportionality increases does the marginal effect change
sign. In addition to that, it becomes less signiﬁcant as one moves to the right. The
interpretation is that if disproportionality is too large, the type of the voting system is not a
good predictor of institutional emergence anymore. For small levels of disproportionality,
however, there seems to be some predictive power, and it shows in the same direction as for
advanced countries.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















































































Observations 47 64 47 64 23 40
R² 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.52 0.42
F 12.74 11.33 9.25 7.94 4.85 3.92
OLS results. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
What can the legal origin of transition countries tell us about their role in shaping
institutions? Table 4.4 provides some results. As before, three institutional measures are used,
investor protection in columns 1 and 2, labour market institutions in 3 and 4 and ﬁnally,
Knell and Srholec’s coordination index. As before, two models are estimated: a model
excluding any transition countries and one including transition countries with interaction
terms. Interpretation has to be cautious, because transition countries are conﬁned to being of
German or French legal origin only. Hence, the model for a transition country of German
legal origin is found by setting both the transition dummy and German dummy equal to one.
The German transition countries hence are measured against their French origin transition
counterparts and at the same time against all non-German and non-transition countries.
Results in Table 4.4 show that the legal origin does matter for overall investor protection.
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non-transition countries: compared to the Common-Law tradition Eastern European countries
exhibit less worse investor protection than Western countries. When it comes to labor market
institutions (columns 3 and 4) and the overall degree of coordination (columns 5 and 6), the
effect of a German heritage is more pronounced in transition countries. As can be seen the
interaction term is positive when transition countries are introduced and the joint effect is
signiﬁcant. Hence, a German legal origin transition country shows more rigid labour market
institutions and a greater degree of coordination than other German origin countries.
Results for cultural attitudes as explanatory variables are shown in Table 4.5. First, the results
correspond what is usually found. The cultural variable has a positive sign on investor
protection and is negatively associated with labor market rigidity and coordination. Hence,
the cultural attitude towards more egalitarianism is correlated with lower investor protection,
higher labor market rigidity and coordination levels. The inclusion of transition countries
with interaction terms between a transition dummy and cultural variable leads to the
conclusion that for investor protection the cultural attitude is irrelevant. The marginal effect
is lower than for non-transition countries, and what is more, it is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. This changes for labor market rigidity and coordination: here the effect is found to
be larger in transition countries than non-transition countries. Needless to mention, the
number of observations becomes worryingly low for cultural variables, which warrants
cautious interpretation of the results.
In a last step, fuller models including variables from all three possible determinants of the
emergence of institutions are estimated. The results can be found in Table 4.6. For each of the
dependent variables a model including jointly proportionality and the legal origin with
respective interaction terms (models 1, 3 and 5), and a second model with all three
independent variables, proportionality, legal origin and culture (remaining models 2, 4 and
6). Focusing on the marginal effects for transition countries it can be observed that the
proportionality has a signiﬁcant effect on labor market rigidity (model 3), which is lost if the
cultural variable is introduced (model 4). 
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Observations 33 42 33 42 22 31
R² 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.47 0.47
F 10.87 5.38 10.85 5.23 8.27 5.80
OLS results. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The effect on investor protection in model 1 is positive and signiﬁcant in model 1, but not
signiﬁcant anymore in model 2. However, the limited predictive power of proportionality in
transition countries due to large disproportionality of election results has been documented
above (see results in Table 4.3). Next, the German legal origin dummy is signiﬁcant for
transition countries in both models 1 and 2 on investor protection, but does not appear
signiﬁcantly different from zero in all other models. Cultural attitudes retain their signiﬁcance
for the explanation of labor market institutions in transition countries, as can be seen in
model 4. It can be noted that the coordination index is not well explained by any of the right-
hand side variables except the French origin dummy variable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)































































































































































Observations 56 38 56 38 38 30
R² 0.61 0.68 0.54 0.70 0.45 0.67
F 9.08*** 5.82*** 6.99*** 6.43*** 3.01*** 3.81***
OLS results. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It cannot be emphasized enough that the cross-sectional results in this section should be taken
with a grain of salt. In particular, models using the coordination index as dependent variable
LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE: LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE 86and cultural attitudes as independent variable are plagued by too small numbers of
observation. Also, including a number of interaction terms always risks the danger of
mulitcollinearity. That said, these results are illustrative. Before drawing further conclusions.
in a next step, panel data of transition countries alone are used for a more in-depth analysis of
investor protection.
4.5.7  Panel estimation
Exploiting variations in the data across countries and over time, a panel estimation can
further insights about the comparative importance of different determinants. A set of
summary statistics are reported in Table A2 in the appendix (page 94). The reform process in
general and the construction of the indicator speciﬁcally involves path dependencies to a
large degree, which warrants the use of dynamic panel models. Furthermore, modern
dynamic panel estimations are capable of dealing with endogeneity in explanatory variables.
Speciﬁcally, an Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system-GMM model will be estimated
(Roodman 2009; Wawro 2002). 
Due to lacking data on labor market institutions for a sufﬁcient number of countries and
years, the panel estimation is conﬁned to the analysis of investor protection. The EBRD
transition indicator on securities legislation, which includes investor protection, is used as the
dependent variable.
The base model is given by
 where  (2)
In equation (2), refers to the investor protection score in country i in year t, represents
the matrix of explanatory variables of the political, legal and cultural spheres of countries,
GDP measures and additional control variables. The vectors and are to be estimated.
The lagged dependent variable is expected to have a signiﬁcant positive effect on the
left-hand side , since it attempts to measure how investor protection converges towards
market economy institutions. This means that a great deal of path dependency is to be
expected.
As can be seen in (2), with the term the model includes an unobserved country-speciﬁc
effect, which is constant across time within countries. Since it is constant, it is removed by
ﬁrst-differencing (2). The estimation strategy of system-GMM models involves using
“internal” instruments to purge the remaining correlation between the explanatory variables
and the error term. These instruments can be dubbed internal, because they are provided by
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instruments available after ﬁrst-differencing and instruments from estimated level equations
will be used.
The analysis involves both endogenous and exogenous variables on the right-hand side of the
estimation equation. Clearly, the legal origin and cultural attitudes are slow-moving
institutions, which had been already in place before transition started. Other variables,
notably the outcome of political elections, the choice of the electoral system and the choice of
privatization methods must be expected to be endogenous. The great advantage of the
system-GMM estimation employed here is that it allows to include all exogenous and
endogenous variables as explanatory variables while still recognizing their potential
endogeneity and using both exogenous and lagged endogenous variables as potential
instruments. One-step estimators are used here, because they prove to be more reliant in
smaller samples (see Wawro 2002: 35).
Results are given in Table 4.7. Model 1 shows results for a model excluding culture. The
legal origin German is assumed to be strictly exogenous, while all other explanatory enter as
being endogenous. Adjusted proportionality has the expected negative sign and is shown to
be signiﬁcant. The partisan variables Left, Right, Center are not as expected and furthermore
not signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on direct sales as predominant privatization strategy is
positive and signiﬁcant: a privatization according to direct sales goes together with better
investor protection, while MEBOs show negative impact. In the remaining columns, the
cultural variable is introduced, which unfortunately decreases sample size considerably.
The coefﬁcient on adjusted proportionality retains the sign, but misses the conventional
signiﬁcance levels in model 3. It should be noted that the coefﬁcient on the legal origin is
never signiﬁcantly different from zero, while the coefﬁcient on the cultural indicator does
show a signiﬁcant impact in model 4. Direct sales prove to be signiﬁcantly positively
connected to better investor protection in models 2 and 3, too.
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Observations 111 75 75 66
Countries 15 9 9 8
AR(1) 0.0127 0.0432 0.0024 0.063
AR(2) 0.527 0.739 0.796 0.323
Sargan 0.534 0.983 0.998 0.145
No. of instruments 64 57 58 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: includes all countries for which the Freedom House index scores a 5 and lower for a moving average of
4 years. All models include year dummy variables. In all models instruments are collapsed into linear
combinations. One-step estimations. Variables are between 0 and 1.
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second-order. The result does not lead to reject the models, in fact, ﬁrst order-autoregression
is expected in dynamic panel models. In addition, p-values of Sargan tests of overidentifying
restrictions reported in Table 4.7 do not lead us to reject their validity.
In a related test, the sample will be split. Table 4.8 reports results for a model including only
EU member states in columns 1 and 2. It can be seen that the coefﬁcient on adjusted
proportionality is negative as expected and retains signiﬁcance when the German legal
dummy is introduced in column 2. Estimating the impact for countries that are not members
of the European Union does not produce the same results. Quite on the contrary, the sign on
adjusted proportionality switches and becomes insigniﬁcant. We see an insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient on both German and French legal origin, with no Western legal tradition as the
reference category. It should be noted, however, that speciﬁcally the results of the model in
column 3 should be interpreted cautiously, because the number of countries, 9, is small. A
tentative explanation for the lack of signiﬁcance and change of sign is that countries, which
have not become part of the European Union suffer the most from oligarchic structures. It can
be expected that oligarchs controlling speciﬁc industries such as natural resources have little
interest in increasing transparency as a whole and investor protection speciﬁcally. In such
setting, the proposed coalitions in favor of less investor protection can very well change. A
proportional system would have precisely the opposite effect by giving voice to more societal
groups opposing the oligarchs’ dominant position. Obviously, much better data on the degree
of oligarchic structures would be needed to investigate such a conjecture.
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(1) (2) (3)

































Observations 124 124 73
Countries 10 10 9
AR(1) 0.0462 0.0426 0.139
AR(2) 0.888 0.858 0.460
Sargan 0.527 0.491 0.192
No. of instruments 31 32 32
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Models 1 and 2 include only EU member states, while model 3 includes only those, which are not
member of the EU. Both have to fulﬁl the requirement that the Freedom House score is 5 or lower for a
moving average of 4 years. All models include year dummy variables. In all models instruments are collapsed
into linear combinations. One-step estimations. Variables are between 0 and 1.
4.6 Conclusion
Cautious interpretation of the evidence presented in this paper leads us to conclude that the
proportionality of an electoral system has an impact on chosen institutions in the areas of
corporate governance and labor market institutions. When corrected for unusually high
disproportionality of election results in Central and Eastern Europe, which stems mostly from
typical features of emerging democracies such as a large number of small parties, it could be
shown that the more seats are allotted according to proportional representation, the lower is
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that a more proportional electoral system has produced more corporatist countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.
While the legal origin in Central and Eastern European countries does show some impact, it
looses the explanatory power when a more detailed dynamic panel model is estimated.
Cultural differences most likely have an impact, too, but a larger sample of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, for which comparable data on cultural issues exist, would be
desirable. It should be kept in mind, however, that other than most empirical papers using
legal origin as explanatory variable, in this paper there are no Common Law countries.
Hence, the commonly evoked divide between Common Law and Civil Law cannot be
addressed here. However, it is interesting to note that using the latest investor protection data
on the whole German legal origin countries do somewhat worse than their French
counterparts, which goes against the standard result in the Legal origin literature. Looking at
Central and Eastern European countries the picture changes again: here, German origin
countries seem to score better on those indicators.
Cultural attitudes as measured in this paper have an inﬂuence on the choice of institutions,
but the inferences are weakest due to lack of data for a larger group of countries. A larger
sample of countries for which quantiﬁed measure of attitudes towards economic institutions
and outcomes are available would clearly strengthen the entire analysis, because it would
make the instruments more reliable.
Apart from political, cultural or legal issues, the concrete policy choice of privatization
method appears to have an inﬂuence on the degree of investor protection. While further
theoretical and empirical research is needed, this suggests that there is a form of
complementarity between privatization methods and investor protection. The inference is
hard to pin down, but certainly it could be the case that a business-friendly government
simultaneously chooses both direct sales as a privatization method and high investor
protection.
What are lessons learnt for the discussion of competing explanations of institutional
differences? Most certainly, the analysis has bolstered the case of political economists, who
argue for political root causes of institutional emergence and change. While the Legal Origin-
view has always stood an theoretically thin grounds, the encompassing empirical results have
been their strength. Whether the effect is a direct one from legal traditions to the type of
economic institutions is put into question by the analysis in this paper.
LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE: LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE 92Appendix
Table A1: Cultural Index
Country Value Country Value
Italy -1.32 New Zealand .06687
Norway -1.1515 Ireland .1161
Austria -.9191 Mexico .2992
Finland -.8174 Hungary .308
Germany -.8146 Australia .3517
Spain -.7867 Slovak Republic .38178
France -.7643 Bulgaria .4602
Sweden -.7585 United Kingdom .57676
Portugal -.6735 Venezuela .6475
Denmark -.6408 United States .7356
Slovenia -.6183 Russia .8365
Switzerland -.4782 Japan .8989
Greece -.4199 Poland .9176
Argentina -.3179 Georgia .9316
Canada -.2254 Philippines 1.0885
Netherlands -.1957 Turkey 1.1397
Estonia -.1816 Singapore 1.2503
Chile -.1648 Israel 1.291




Note: Index derived from a principal component analysis of four cultural values according to Licht et al. (2005,
2007). See explanation in text.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Proportionality overall 1.855852 .858151 0 2.889522 N =     197
n =      19
T = 10.3684
(adjusted) between .8489603 0 2.800338
within .1489752 .9798972 2.339313
MEBO overall .345283 .4384661 0 1 N =     212
n =      21
T = 10.0952
between .4235953 0 1
within .1607669 -.1975741 .9816467
Mass priv. overall .3509434 .4339274 0 1 N =     212
n =      21
T = 10.0952
between .3873154 0 1
within .1990365 -.3763293 .922372
Sales overall .2339623 .3985487 0 1 N =     212
n =      21
T = 10.0952
between .3491013 0 1
within .1905117 -.4024014 .961235
Left overall .3448529 .4059193 0 1 N =     272
n =      23
T-bar = 11.8261
between .3512313 0 1
within .244368 -.2926471 1.073424
Right overall .2036765 .3368857 0 1 N =     272
n =      23
T-bar = 11.8261
between .2859071 0 1
within .21903 -.3347851 .8959842
Center overall .1007353 .2611347 0 1 N =     272
n =      23
T-bar = 11.8261
between .2247089 0 .8333333
within .1355714 -.532598 .7468891
log GDP p.c. overall 7.826282 1.08671 4.967031 10.20981 N =     302
n =      23
T = 13.1304
between .9792533 5.741639 9.329758
within .531822 6.278096 9.296004
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Marginal effect of proportionality on
investor protection for different
values of disproportionality
Marginal effect of proportionality on
labour market institutions for
different values of disproportionality
Marginal effect of proportionality on
coordination index for different
values of disproportionality
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This thesis investigated structural effects of institutional diversity and, in more detail, the
emergence of institutions in Central and Eastern European transition countries. Concerning
the former, it presented evidence that companies are guided by institutional differences in
their investment decisions abroad. Employing sectoral outward FDI data by German
companies and a number of different measures of possible comparative institutional
advantage, German ﬁrms tend to invest more in a sector with a comparative institutional
advantage depending on the size of the sector. This suggests that the institutional advantage is
only present in sufﬁciently large sectors, which can be seen as a proxy for a general capacity
of a sector in terms of skills or networks. Naturally, there are a number of ways in which the
analysis could be developed further. First of all, a sample of sectoral FDI on a bilateral
country-to-country basis would clearly bolster the case in favor of an institutional argument
of FDI. The sectoral breakdown would have to be as precise as with the Bundesbank data
used in this thesis. Second, more detailed information on the activity of afﬁliates in host
countries would allow us to estimate more precise models, which could disentangel
horizontal and vertical FDI. Third, extended analysis of panel data on FDI could attempt to
trace changes in advantages of nations over time. 
Possible shortcomings of the data aside, the possibility of an international institutional
arbitrage between nations reasons against premature claims of institutional convergence
across countries. The literature on comparative economic systems puts forward the claim that
different ways to organize business result in different economic structures; it can also be
shown that different systems can reach high income levels by making use of comparative
strengths. One could argue that due to lower barriers to trade and movement of input factors,
what is commonly known as “globalization”, institutional systems must become alike,
because companies are easier able to vote with their feet. But, assuming that there are
comparative institutional advantages on the basis not of quality but the type of institutions,
business voting with their feet just reinforce the differences by moving production to those
locations, which offer the “right” institutional mix for a given activity. The evidence found in
the ﬁrst paper of the thesis corroborates just that.
The country study of Estonia and Slovenia has shown that there is diversity across Central
and Eastern European transition countries. Although both have successfully negotiated and
reformed their way into European Union, the institutional set-up has proven to be almost
diametrically opposed. Tying in with the evidence of the ﬁrst paper opening up trade and
96factor markets has not made Eastern European countries all equal.
Thirdly, the thesis took a stab at analyzing the broader experience in Central and Eastern
European countries. Speciﬁcally, the goal was to learn from those countries about the relative
importance of existing theories of the determinants of institutions. While this is always a
challenging task due to endogeneity issues and general data problems in cross-country
comparisons, some conclusions can safely be drawn. Apparently, political determinants of
electoral systems matter for the emergence of institutions in transition countries, but partisan
variables do not seem to matter so much. The last observation somewhat resonates with
political science literature, which observes an ideological spectrum along other dimensions
than the traditional left-right in Central and Eastern Europe. The observed high
disproportionality deserves further investigation. As democracies mature with party systems
stabilizing further institutional changes can be expected as the “right” constituencies will be
better represented. Special attention should be paid to the future development of countries in
Central Asia; they stand out in that they exhibit the purest majoritarian systems in the region,
but have been mostly excluded from this analyis due to a lack of political freedom and civic
societies. The issue of oligarchic structures in some countries, which could lead to a reverse
prediction with respect to the effect of a proportionality on investor protection would also
require a more detailed look. Speciﬁcally, its development over time with some countries
solving the problem earlier than others and across countries with different degrees of state
capture could offer new insights.
Cultural inﬂuences of instiutions warrant further analysis. There are at least two alternatives
for future research. The Schwartz (1994) data, which offer a well-grounded set of indices of
cultural values can be expanded to include more countries. This would mean a comparable
set of indices. Alternatively, a workable and founded alternative indicator available for a
large number of countries could be developed further. The World Value Survey and possibly
the Eurobarometer surveys come to mind.
The overall ﬁnding that the legal origin of countries in Central and Eastern Europe is of less
importance highlights the need for a more meaningful and useful distinction of legal systems,
lest it becomes a mere historical description of the emergence of French and English Law
only. Since authors in the Legal Origin tradition emphasize the long-lasting inﬂuence of legal
tradition on institutions today, there is little reason to believe it should not play a role in
Central and Eastern European countries. In fact, recent publications code the transition
countries according to their pre-war heritage. There are a number of attempts to ﬁnd criteria
of a classiﬁcations of legal systems, which are grounded in the concept of institutional
complementarities. Pistor (2005) and Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) make a step into this
direction by pointing out possible feedback effects between substantive and procedural rules
CONCLUSION 97on both company strategy and other economic institutions. Such a view could offer a rich
insight into the interplay between institutions of the legal system and rules governing the
economy. The experience of Central and Eastern Europe could offer a real-life experiment
for this, too.
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